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ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE FOREIGN COMMERCE
POWER: A CASE STUDY OF THE REGULATION OF
EXPORTS
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the beginning of the Cold War the United States has
sought to safeguard its national security and further its foreign
policy by stifling the flow of selected goods to nations deemed to
be unfriendly.' In the post-war era, when American economic
superiority was undoubted, the fear that exports of strategic
goods and know-how might exhaust domestic supplies or be used
by other nations in a manner contrary to United States interests
predominated over the interests of free trade.2 Today, it is the
failure to export enough goods and know-how that threatens the
welfare of the United States. The weakening of the United States
balance of trade has awakened the public to the need for active
trade promotion.3 It is now apparent that national security
depends on economic security as well as military security, and
that trade cannot be used as a bargaining chip of foreign policy
without damage to domestic interests. Since the decision whether
or not to export carries a cost with either alternative, it is vital
that this decision be made by responsible officials in a fair and
reliable manner. What is required is an intelligent consideration
' Until the enactment of the Export Control Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 80-11, 63 Stat. 7
(1949) (repealed 1969), which subjected exports to continual restriction for economic and na-
tional security purposes, United States export controls were imposed only as a temporary
measure during war and other emergencies. See Note, Export Controls, 58 YALE L.J. 1325,
1325-29 (1949). The Export Control Act was replaced by the Export Administration Act of
1969. See note 5 infra.
' Berman & Garson, United States Export Controls-Past, Present, and Future, 67
COLUM. L. REv. 791, 794-796 (1967); Note, Export Control, 58 YALE L. J. 1325, 1329-31 (1949).
' See generally Export Policy: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Finance
of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
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and balancing of competing interests, and a formulation of policy
which is responsive to public needs.
The existing regulatory framework for the control of strategic
exports has been widely criticized as misguided, irrational and
overly restrictive. While government officials and private ex-
porters alike agree that some regulation is necessary,' the proper
method of regulation has been the subject of continuing debate.
Under the Export Administration Act of 19691 (EAA), the Presi-
dent has been authorized to screen exports and prevent the
overseas sale of goods or know-how which might contribute to the
military potential of hostile nations, or which might usefully be
withheld for purposes of foreign policy. The exports regulated
under the EAA are not intrinsically dangerous. Armaments,
nuclear technology and other exports which might pose an im-
mediate threat to security are regulated under other legislation'
and are not within the scope of this note. The EAA subjects ex-
ports of every type to the possibility of a limited restriction or em-
bargo. Every businessman who contemplates entering the export
market must first consult the extensive regulations which have
been promulgated pursuant to the EAA.
Although the administration of the EAA is centralized in the
Commerce Department, the authority to make judgments affec-
ting the regulation of exports is scattered throughout the ex-
ecutive branch. This diffusion of authority has led to a sense of in-
direction and internal conflict within the regulatory structure.
Coupled with the lack of precise legislative guidelines, the failure
of executive officials to provide centralized policy-making has im-
peded the normal processes by which administrative government
is made accountable. Neither the Congress nor the President have
demonstrated the capacity to provide the necessary oversight of
export regulation in the face of these organizational difficulties.
' See, e.g. Extension of the Export Administration Act of 1969: Hearings before the
House Comm. on International Relations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 364 (1976) (Statement of the
National Association of Manufactures) [hereinafter cited as 1976 House Hearings]; id. at 363
(Statement of McCloskey).
5 50 U.S.C.A. App. §§ 2401-2413 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
' For a summary of legislation related to these special problems, see Archibald, Arms
Transfers by the United States, 10 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 249 (1977); Bauser, United
States Nuclear Export Policy: Developing the Peaceful Atom as a Commodity in Interna-
tional Trade, 18 HARV. INT'L L. J. 227 (1977); Hoya, The Changing U.S. Regulation of East-
West Trade, 12 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 6 n. 30 (1973).
[Vol. 9:577
FOREIGN COMMERCE POWER
The problem of making government accountable in this field is
made more difficult by the special character of the authority to
regulate exports. Foreign affairs and national security powers
have often been treated as special exceptions to the normal prin-
ciples of democratic government. The result has been a relaxation
of certain constitutional requirements of procedure. Export
regulation, like other matters of foreign policy and national securi-
ty, presents a problem of accommodating the exigencies of the
modern world with old but fundamental constitutional values. The
undue sacrifice of constitutional principles is an additional factor
in the loss of accountability in the regulation of exports. The trun-
cated form of due process pervasive in the regulatory structure,
and the misallocation of power therein, have defeated the basic
tenet of constitutional democracy, that governmental authority
must be accountable to the public.
The purpose of this note is to provide a legal analysis of the
EAA and to propose a new accommodation of the international
relations powers and constitutional values. Two principles will
serve as the basis for this analysis: separation of power, and due
process of law. Both of these principles serve to achieve the goal
of accountable government, the former through the oversight of
elected officials, and the latter by the participation of individual
members of the public in the administrative process by which
they are regulated. By suggesting a reexamination of these prin-
ciples and their applicability to the regulation of exports, it is
hoped that the direction of United States trade policy may be prop-
erly reoriented and more effectively executed.
II. THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
The EAA posits three facts of international trade. First, the
availability in the world market of certain materials exported by
the United States "may have an important bearing upon fulfill-
ment of the foreign policy of the United States."7 Second, certain
exports, if unrestricted, may contribute to the military potential
of other nations and endanger the national security of the United
7 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 2401(1). This section also states that the availability of certain sup-
plies may affect domestic economic conditions, and lays the foundation for short supply
commodity controls. The use of export controls to protect the domestic economy, however
is not considered in this Note.
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States.' Third, despite these compelling reasons for the regulation
of exports, the EAA recognizes that "[tihe unwarranted restric-
tion of exports from the United States has a serious adverse effect
on our balance of payments .... ,,' These three Congressional find-
ings state the dilemma of export regulation. Against the free
trade policy of the United States must be weighed the need to
safeguard other critical national interests.
The dilemma is restated in the declaration of policy of the EAA,
but as the EAA is an act to restrict, rather than promote, United
States exports, the policy statement is slanted in favor of export
control. Only brief and passing mention is made of a free trade
policy. Though trade generally is to be encouraged, an exception
is made for trade with certain nations or of certain products which
the President deems "against the national interest" or "detrimen-
tal to the national security of the United States."'0 It is unclear in
the EAA how the President is to make such distinctions, except
as a matter of broad presidential discretion. If there is a primary
policy emphasized in the EAA, it is the policy of export restric-
tion, but the encouragement of exports is an objective of at least
secondary and possibly equal importance."
Two general grounds for the restriction of exports are provid-
ed. The President may use controls "to the extent necessary to
further significantly the foreign policy of the United States and to
fulfill its international responsibilities."'" Alternatively, the Presi-
dent may impose controls "to the extent necessary to exercise the
necessary vigilance over exports from the standpoint of their
significance to the national security of the United States."" More
specifically, the President may use export controls as leverage to
Id § 2401(2).
Id. § 2401(3).
'0 Id. § 2402(1).
The objectives of trade promotion and trade restriction are again juxtaposed in section
2402(4), which states that "It is the policy of the United States to use its economic resources
and trade potential to further the sound growth and stability of its economy as well as to
further its national security and foreign policy objectives." This policy declaration only
repeats in more general terms the statement of section 2402(1). Although section 2402(4)
states the policy of trade promotion more as an equal to the policy of trade restriction, sec-
tion 2402(4) might also be seized upon as a much broader authorization for control, since its
direction to use trade restrictions to further national security and foreign policy is not
qualified as is section 2402(1), by the proviso that restrictions must be imposed only to the
extent necessary to achieve these purposes.
.2 Id. § 2402(B).
1" Id. § 2402(C).
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force the removal of restrictions of supplies imposed by other na-
tions,1 or to prevent the encouragement by other nations of "in-
ternational terrorism."15 These specific directions do not enlarge
the power of the President but only provide examples of how con-
trols might be used for purposes of foreign policy.
The administration of the EAA is centralized in the Office of
Export Administration (OEA) of the Department of Commerce, 8
but the authority to determine what exports shall be prohibited is
delegated to the President, 7 who is further authorized to delegate
his powers as he deems appropriate. 8 The President may em-
power the officials of other executive departments to participate
in the decision to prohibit certain exports. Authority under the
EAA is now shared by several departments, each of which repre-
sents a special government interest or expertise in any given ex-
port. The President, however, has reserved the authority to in-
tervene in the export regulation process and prescribe new rules
and regulations at any time. 9
Exports to particular nations may be approved by either of two
means. When the Department of Commerce issues a general
license, published as a regulation applicable to all exporters, the
listed commodity may be exported to the approved destinations
without the prior approval of the OEA.20 Any export not yet listed
under a general license or which is restricted by the Commodity
Control List (CCL) is prohibited until the OEA has granted its ap-
proval.2 Exporters must then apply for a validated license, which
is a document of specific applicability that is effective only for the
transaction described in the document.' Both general and vali-
dated licenses are subject to revocation at any time without notice,2 3
and the Department of Commerce may order the return of any
shipment that is en route when a license is suddenly revoked.2
"' Id. § 2402(7).
s Id. § 2402(8).
e Id. § 2403(a)(1); Exec. Order No. 12,002, 42 Fed. Reg. 35623 (1977).
17 Id. § 2403(b)(1).
"' Id. § 2403(e).
19 Exec. Order No. 12,002, 42 Fed. Reg. 35723 (1977).
15 C.F.R. § 371.2 (1978).
21 Id. § 370.3(a).
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Exports requiring a validated license may be divided into two
categories. Some restrictions are the result of international nego-
tiations between the United States and its allies. In 1949, the
members of NATO (excluding Iceland but including Japan) joined
efforts to prevent the export of strategic goods to communist na-
tions and formed the Coordinating Committee known as COCOM.25
COCOM has maintained a list of controlled commodities which
may not be exported to certain designated nations by any member
nation. The United States requires a validated license for any ex-
port on the COCOM control list. Applications tentatively approved
by the OEA must then be granted an exception by COCOM. Since
the organization has never been formalized in a treaty, adherence
to the multilateral control list is voluntary. Over the years
COCOM has become increasingly reluctant to restrict exports
because of the growing pro-trade attitude of most of the member
nations. The effectiveness of COCOM is also diminished by the ex-
port trade of highly sophisticated neutral nations such as Sweden
and Switzerland, which provide unrestricted sources of advanced
technology. The United States remains the dominant force in
COCOM, but its resistance to a more rapid relaxation of controls
has drawn criticism from other members.'
The United States supplements the COCOM list with restric-
tions that are unilaterally imposed. These additional restrictions
are more controversial than the multilateral controls because they
place American exporters at a competitive disadvantage against
exporters in more liberal Western nations. The unilateral restric-
tions of the United States have been cited by some observers as a
significant factor in the comparatively low volume of trade be-
tween the United States and Eastern nations.'
The decision whether to require a validated license for any par-
ticular export is based on six factors concerning the commodity:
" The history and operation of CoCom is detailed in Berman & Garson, supra note 2, at
834-42. See also Comptroller General, Report to Congress on Export Controls: Need to
Clarify Policy and Simplify Administration 7-18 (1979).
" Berman & Garson, supra note 2, at 841-42; President's Report to Congress on
Multilateral Export Control, July 10, 1978, reprinted in UNITED STATED EXPORT WEEKLY,
July 18, 1978, at N-i; Comptroller General, Report to Congress, supra note 25, at 8-13.
" Wolf, A Note on the Restrictive Effect of Unilateral United States Export Controls,
81 J. POL. ECON. 219 (1973); Hoya, Changing U.S. Regulation of East-West Trade, 12 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 9-10 (1973). Hoya also notes that many American businesses prefer to
manufacture and export from overseas subsidiaries rather than from the domestic parent in
an effort to avoid United States restrictions. Id.
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(i) Its essential features (distinguishing physical or operating
characteristics; variations between types, models, grade, etc.;
and the technical and strategic significance of these differences).
(ii) Its civilian uses.
(iii) Its military or military-support uses.
(iv) Its end-use pattern in the United States.
(v) Its technological state of development. (Whether it in-
volves a new product and represents the current state of the
art. Whether it contains advanced technology that can feasibly
be extracted.)
(vi) Its availability abroad (whether the same or a comparable
commodity is available from other non-Communist countries and
where and by whom. Whether the foreign product is manufac-
tured abroad with U.S.-origin technology or components). 8
The foreign availability finding is mandated by the EAA, which
states that export controls based on national security shall not be
imposed on commodities which are available without restriction
from sources outside the United States. 9 The point of this provi-
sion is to avoid the needless restriction of United States exports
where foreign availability nullifies the effect of an embargo." The
President is authorized, however, to find that despite foreign
availability the export "would prove detrimental to the national
security of the United States.""1 Theoretically, a presumption
arises against restriction upon a showing of foreign availability."
Because of the wide discretion exercised by the executive branch
and the secrecy of the regulatory process as it now exists, it is
doubtful whether this presumption is taken literally by the
responsible government agencies. Curiously, the regulations em-
phasize consideration of availability in non-Communist countries
only.33 Yet the availability of a commodity in Communist countries
is equally important to the effectiveness of export controls where
the purpose of the controls is to keep the commodity out of Com-
munist hands. The EAA adopts the broader view by speaking of
the importance of availability in the entire world market. The nar-
50 U.S.C.A. App. § 2403(b)(2)(B) (Cum. Supp. 1978).
" H.R. REP. No 190, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1978), reprinted in [19771 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 362, 369-70.
" 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 2403(b)(2)(B) (Cum. Supp. 1978).
" H.R. REP. No. 190, supra note 30 at 8-9.
See also 15 C.F.R. § 370.11(a)(1)(i) (1978).
19791
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row availability standard expressed in the Department's regula-
tions is therefore out of line with Congressional intent.
More important is the absence in the regulations of a considera-
tion of the economic impact of export restrictions. While the EAA
is unfortunately vague on the weight to be accorded to economic
interests, the need to expand United States trade and strengthen
the balance of payments has been recognized by Congress and in-
tegrated into the EAA declarations of policy." The failure of the
Department of Commerce to add the economic value of exporta-
tion to its list of relevant factors emasculates the trade promotion
policy as a counter-weight to trade restriction.
The EAA directs the Department of Commerce to consult with
other interested executive departments and independent agencies
in its determination of what commodities must be controlled.3
Private exporters are encouraged to submit recommendations
concerning any commodity, 3 but by virtue of the EAA's exemp-
tion from the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act,37
the Department is not required to give public notice of what com-
modities are scheduled for consideration. A more valuable avenue
for the participation of exporters in the rulemaking process is
through the Technical Advisory Committees established by the
Department, and composed of representatives from government
and industry.'
Applications for validated licenses are processed by the OEA,3
which may by itself approve or deny applications 0 or refer them
to other consulting departments. Applications are subject to
review by the Department of Defense if the commodity is one
listed by the Secretary of Defense as an item that "will make a
significant contribution . . . to the military potential" of certain
countries, and "would prove detrimental to the national security
of the Untied States." 1 The Department of Defense thus holds a
See 50 U.S.C.A. App. §§ 2402(1)(A), 2402(4) (Cum. Supp. 1978). See also 50 U.S.C.A.
App. §§ 2401(3), 2401(4), 2401(5).
' Id § 2404(a).
3. 15 C.F.R. § 370.1(b)(2) (1978).
17 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 2407 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
Id § 2404(c); 15 C.F.R. § 390.1 (1978). But see text accompanying notes 234-41 infra.
15 C.F.R. § 372.4 (1978).
, 1976 House Hearings, supra note 4, at 321 (statement of the Domestic and Interna-
tional Business Administration).
" 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 2403(n) (Cum. Supp. 1978).
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statutory veto power in this review procedure." The Department
of Defense also serves as a consulting department in the review of
other licenses. Additional consulting departments include the
Department of State, the Department of Energy, NASA and the
CIA.4" The agencies and departments to which the OEA refers an
application are largely determined by the nature of the interests
affected by the application, or by the technical expertise required
to review the application. As each department or agency receives
an export application, the application may be forwarded to more
specialized offices." Representatives from each of these depart-
ments and agencies meet periodically as an Operating Committee
to consider and vote on license applications.'5 The members of the
Operating Committee strive to achieve unanimity on every licens-
ing decision, a practice that has vested a veto power in each of the
voting departments." The Commerce Department has resisted
pressure to move toward a majority vote rule with the assertion
that only a unanimity requirement will adequately protect na-
tional security or foreign policy interests."'
Most applications not resolved at the administrative level of the
OEA are resolved by the Operating Committee, but those that are
unusually controversial may be referred to the Sub-Advisory
Committee on Export Policy, consisting of deputy assistant secre-
taries of each of the participating departments. From that level of
review applications may be referred upward to the Advisory Com-
mittee on Export Policy (ACEP), consisting of the assistant secre-
taries, and then to the Export Administration Review Board, con-
sisting of the Secretaries of Defense, State and Treasury. Ulti-
mately, the application may reach the desk of the President, who
42 Id. § 2403(n)(2). The President, however, is authorized to override any veto by the
Secretary of Defense under this provision. Id.
41 Comptroller General, Report to Congress on Export Controls: Need to Clarify Policy
and Simplify Administration 34 (1979). The OEA may request the aid of other agencies as
the need arises. Id
" Id. at 37-42.
SId. at 35-36.
" Comptroller General, Report to Congress on Export Control Administration of
United States Export Licensing Should Be Consolidated 3 (1978). Not every department
represented at Operating Committee meetings is a voting member. In most instances votes
are cast by the Departments of Defense, State, Energy and Commerce. Id.
" 1976 House Hearings, supra note 4, at 315-16 (Statement of the Domestic and Interna-
tional Business Administration).
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holds the power to make the final decision.48 Despite this elaborate
review system, license applications seldom pass beyond the Sub-
ACEP level. 9
Export license applicants are not afforded an adjudicative hear-
ing on the merits of their application, since the export regulation
process is wholly exempt from the Administrative Procedure
Act's hearing requirements."0 The exclusion of the exporter from
the proceedings is an especially severe measure since applications
reach OEA with a presumption against approval.51 General infor-
mation about the possible grounds for denial of the license,
however, is available on request to the applicant,52 who may then
submit relevant evidence and documentation.0 The most frequent
questions which arise are those considered initially in the classifi-
cation of the commodity on the Commodity Control List: 1) avail-
ability from Free World sources, 2) potential strategic uses, and 3)
destination." License approval procedures are essentially a recon-
sideration of the merits of an export on a case-by-case basis, but at
any point new arguments or evidence might be raised in favor of
or against the export; or a shift in policy may change the grounds
for the control of the export.
Delay in the approval of licenses has been chronic under the
EAA 5 despite periodic efforts by Congress to impose time limits
" Comptroller General, supra note 46, at 4-5; G. Bertsch, Export Controls and East-West
Trade: Comprehensive Strategy or Ad Hoc Responses? 7-8 (1978) (unpublished paper on file
at the Dean Rusk Center for International and Comparative Law, University of Georgia
School of Law, Athens, Georgia).
" Comptroller General, supra note 46, at 4-5. In 1977, only five applications reached the
sub-ACEP level, and none reached the ACEP or EARB. Id. The sub-ACEP is now used
more frequently, but the ACEP and EARB remain in disuse. Bertsch, supra note 48, at 8.
' 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 2407 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
" Bassiouni & Bandau, Presidential Discretion in Foreign Trade and its Effect on East-
West Trade, 14 WAYNE L. REV. 494, 521 (1968); Bingham & Johnson, A Rational Approach
to Export Controls, 57 FOREIGN AFF. 894, 902-03 (1979); H.R. REP. No. 190, supra note 30, at
362, 364. In the 1977 Amendments to the EAA, Publ. L. 95-52, § 103, 91 Stat. 235 (amending
50 U.S.C.A. App. § 2403(b)(2)(B)) Congress made a limited effort to reverse the presumption,
but this reversal of the presumption takes effect only on a showing of foreign availability.
Moreover, once a commodity is placed on the Commodity Control List, the reversal of
presumption sought by Congress is no longer in effect, and the burden of proof returns to
the exporter. This is because exports requiring a validated license have already been deter-
mined to pose a threat to national security or foreign policy.
52 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 2408(1) (Cum. Supp. 1978); 15 C.F.R. § 370.11 (1978).
" 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 2408(3) (Cum. Supp. 1978); 15 C.F.R. § 370.11(a)(1) (1978).
15 C.F.R. § 370.11(a)(1) (1978).
5 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Economic Policy and Trade of the
House Comm. on International Relations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., (1979) (statement of F.
Huszagh, G. Bertsch & J. McIntyre) [hereinafter cited as 1979 House Hearings].
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on the licensing process." The EAA now states that any applica-
tion shall be approved or disapproved within ninety days, unless
the Department of Commerce determines that additional time is
needed and notifies the applicant of the circumstances of the
delay.57 After ninety days the applicant must also be informed of
"questions raised and negative considerations or recommenda-
tions made by any agency or department,"" although the preci-
sion with which the issues must be stated is doubtful. The appli-
cant may then respond to the questions raised, and the deciding
authorities are directed to "take fully into account the applicant's
response.""s
Whenever a license application is disapproved, the applicant
must be informed of the specific statutory basis for the denial."
Since the reason for denial need state only its statutory basis, a
recitation of the EAA's policy objectives (reasons of "national
security" or "foreign policy") will qualify without further elabora-
tion. Administrative appeals from the denial of a license applica-
tion are confined to very narrow grounds. The Department of
Commerce will hear appeals based only on "exceptional and
unreasonable hardship" or discriminatory impact. 1
III. AUTHORITY TO REGULATE EXPORTS
A. Sources of Authority
The administration of export restrictions under the EAA by the
executive branch is premised on a delegation of Congressional
authority to the President.2 This authority has an original source
in the constitutional responsibility of Congress to regulate com-
merce with foreign nations. 3 The power to regulate commerce in-
cludes the power to prohibit absolutely those transactions which
" Congress amended the EAA in 1974 with Act of Oct. 29, 1974, Pub. L. 93-500, § 5(a), 88
Stat. 1553, (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 2403(g)) to impose a ninety day limit on the processing
and approval of export licenses. Dissatisfied with the sluggish response of the bureaucracy,
H.R. REP. No. 190, supra note 30, at 12, Congress strengthened the language of the time
limit provision with Act of June 22, 1977, Pub. L. 95-52, § 106, 91 Stat. 237 (to be codified at
50 U.S.C. § 2403 (g)).




15 C.F.R. § 389(c)(1978).
50 U.S.C.A. § 2403(b)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1978).
6 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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are detrimental to the public interest."4 Viewed exclusively as an
exercise of the commerce power, the authority of the executive
branch to restrict exports would be wholly dependent on the Con-
gressional grant, and it follows that Congressional policy would be
preeminent in the administration of export regulations. The inter-
national commerce power, however, cannot be segregated from
other, independent bases of constitutional authority. Foreign trade
is inescapably intertwined with foreign affairs and national securi-
ty, and the power of the federal government to make and imple-
ment foreign policy and protect the nation from external threats
may serve as alternative sources of power to regulate exports.
That the foreign affairs and national security powers were con-
templated by Congress as sources of authority is evident in the
form of the EAA. Only the means of export regulation are set out
in the Act. The policies which impel regulation are the general
foreign policies which are made apart from the institutions or
mandate of the EAA, and there is no limit to what foreign policies
may be considered as requiring the regulation of exports. The
EAA is thus a versatile tool for the use of the government in
achieving an unrestricted range of legitimate foreign policy objec-
tives. Viewed as a "necessary and proper" means of exercising the
foreign affairs power, any constitutional limitations on the
breadth of the authority to regulate exports would be determined
from the character of the foreign affairs power.
A general power to conduct foreign affairs is implied by the
Constitution." Specific attributes of the foreign affairs power are
allocated by the Constitution among the federal branches and be-
tween the states and federal government, but the interstitial area
of the foreign affairs power is neither granted to the United
States nor distributed among its parts. The foreign affairs power
might also be conceived as something existing apart from the Con-
stitution. The primary authority for such a proposition is United
States v. Curtiss Wright Corp.,66 which upheld a broad delegation
, United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
,5 In addition to the power to regulate foreign commerce, Congress is authorized to
define and punish crimes against "the Law of Nations," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10, to
declare war, id. cl. 11, to approve agreements and compacts between states and foreign na-
tions, id § 10, cl. 3. The President is authorized to make treaties with the advice and con-
sent of the Senate and to appoint ambassadors, id art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Each grant of authority
supplies the government with specific means for carrying out its foreign policy.
" 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
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of authority by Congress to the President to embargo arms ex-
ports to belligerent nations involved in the Chaco conflict. In a
sweeping dictum, Justice Sutherland's majority opinion described
the foreign affairs power as an extra-constitutional authority aris-
ing as an inherent characteristic of sovereignty, rather than by
constitutional grant."' A disturbing implication of Curtiss Wright
is that the exercise of foreign affairs powers is unbounded by the
constitution, and that the President or Congress might run rough-
shod over individual rights on the assertion of a "foreign affairs"
objective. 8 Subsequent scholarly criticism has rebutted the
historical basis of Sutherland's theory. 9 The analytical basis of the
theory is equally unsound. It may well be assumed that a people
can speak effectively as a nation in world affairs only through a
central government, but it does not follow that the people must
authorize the central government to do and say what it pleases.
National foreign policy is formulated and implemented by national
institutions, not by an imagined national entity. The people may
certainly limit the authority of those institutions, as the American
people have limited their federal government in internal affairs by
the constitution."0 A theory which creates an authority above the
constitution does violence to the intended distribution and limita-
tion of government power. Nor is a theory of extra-constitutional
authority necessary to enable the Federal government to ad-
minister foreign affairs. The expansive modern reading of the
Commerce Clause provides one very broad constitutional base for
much foreign affairs activity. The constitutional authority to make
treaties, appoint and receive ambassadors, and declare war pro-
vides the essential tools of foreign policy, from which other needed
but incidental tools may be implied. A theory of implied foreign af-
fairs powers, however, would gravitate toward specific grants of
" Id. at 318. The foreign affairs power was vested in the federal government, according
to Sutherland, but the passage of external sovereignty directly from Great Britain to the
Union. Id. at 316-317. The constitution, in his view, was intended primarily to allocate inter-
nal powers possessed by each state individually prior to the creation of the federal govern-
ment. The failure of the constitution to ennumerate and delegate a general foreign affairs
power was therefore was deemed by Sutherland to be of no consequence. Id. at 315.
Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice Sutherland's
Theory, 55 YALE L. J. 467, 490 (1946).
" Levitan, supra note 68; Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss Wright Export Corporation:
An Historical Reassessment, 83 YALE L. J. 1 (1973).
"' See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1957); M. BELOFF, FOREIGN POLICY AND THE
DEMOCRATIC PROCESS 16-18 (1955).
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authority, and would be limited by the rights reserved to states
and individuals. In accordance with a theory of implied foreign
affairs powers, the Supreme Court since Curtiss Wright has
repudiated the notion that an exercise of foreign policy is not
restrained by the provisions of the constitution.' The constitu-
tionality of export restrictions on technological know-how was sus-
tained by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals against a First
Amendment challenge in United States v. Edler Industries, Inc. 2
but the court held only that the First Amendment was not
violated and conceded that in the case of a true conflict between
constitutional rights and trade restrictions, constitutional rights
should prevail.
A theory of constitutionally implied foreign affairs powers is
not without its own difficulties. There has been a tendency on the
part of the courts to speak of the foreign affairs powers generical-
ly, so that the precise basis for any foreign power may be
obscured. 3 As a result, the distribution of many of the foreign af-
fairs powers among the federal branches remains unclear. There
is also the danger that the special weight and urgency accorded to
the government interest in some foreign affairs cases" will spill
over into all cases tainted by foreign affairs, with a consequent
devaluation of state or individual rights. 5 A discriminating
7 Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1962); Societe Internationale Pour Par-
ticipations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 211 (1958); Reid v.
Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1953). Some forms of the foreign af-
fairs powers tend toward "emergency" powers, and are allowed a greater impact on con-
stitutional rights than would normally be tolerated of domestic actions. Ex Parte Endo, 323
U.S. 283, 300 (1944); Herzabayaski v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
" 579 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1978).
" See, e.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1941), which was decided on the basis of a
Presidential power to recognize foreign governments and make executive agreements. The
Court failed to tie these foreign affairs powers to any constitutional provision, although it
might have found specific support in the President's power to appoint and receive am-
bassadors. The categorical treatment of the foreign affairs powers was taken to an extreme
in Sutherland's theory of extraconstitutional authority. United States v. Curtis Wright
Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). See also Henkin, The Treaty Makers: The Law of the Land and
Foreign Relations, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 903, 920-22 (1959).
" See, e.g., Hirabayaski v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100-01 (1943).
" See, e.g., Perez v. Brownwell, 356 U.S. 44 (1957) where the Court upheld the
withdrawal of citizenship and deportation of a person who had voted in a Mexican political
election and remained outside the United States to avoid the draft. The source of Congres-
sional authority was "its power to deal with foreign affairs." Id. at 59. Perez was later over-
ruled by Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1966). See also United States v. California, 332 U.S.
19 (1947) where the foreign affairs powers served as an argument in favor of the Court's
decision to reject state territorial claims in the United States territorial sea. For a criticism
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analysis is therefore required if the limits and organization of the
foreign affairs powers are not to be blurred. In the case of export
regulation, the most tenable constitutional provision which stands
as a source of authority is the Commerce Clause. 6 To cast the
issue as one of foreign commerce reveals the lines of division be-
tween Congressional and Presidential powers.
B. Distribution of Authority
By its assignment of some foreign affairs powers to both Con-
gress and the President, the Constitution dispels any thought that
foreign affairs should be conducted exclusively by one or the
other branch. The precise balance between the President and Con-
gress has teetered through history. Curtiss Wright represents
one extreme in endowing the President with preeminence in
foreign policy. Except where guided by express foreign affairs
provisions of the constitution, such as the treaty-making pro-
cedure, the foreign affairs power was, to Sutherland, refined only
by principles of pragmatism." Since the executive branch, in
Sutherland's eyes, was the most effective institution in making
and achieving foreign policy objectives, he regarded the President
as possessing primary authority in this realm, with or without
Congressional grants of power:
[W]e are here dealing not alone with an authority vested in the
President by an exertion of legislative power, but with such an
authority plus the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of
the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the
field of international relations - a power which does not require
as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress, but which, of
course, like every other governmental power, must be exercised
in subordination to the applicable provisions of the
Constitution. 8
Under Sutherland's theory of Presidential preeminence in foreign
affairs, the Congressional delegation of power under the EAA
might be regarded as superfluous. In describing the President as
the "sole organ" of the government in international relations,
Sutherland suggested that the President was more than a
of the opinion, see M. BALL, LAW OF THE SEA: FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS AND THE EXTEN-
SION OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA 59-60 (Dean Rusk Center Monograph No. 1, 1978).
" In time of war, however, the regulation of exports might also be recognized as an exer-
cise of the war powers. United States v. Bareno, 50 F. Supp. 520 (D. Md. 1943).
" 299 U.S. at 319-322.
,' Id. at 320.
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spokesman of the United States. Sutherland's second judicial pro-
nouncement on Presidential affairs powers, United States v. Bel-
mont,79 made clear that the President was not limited to making
policy but was also entitled to implement policy by actions having
the effect of domestic law. Belmont upheld the validity of an ex-
ecutive agreement by which the Soviet Union assigned all its
outstanding claims against United States nationals to the United
States government. A New York bank resisted a United States ac-
tion for Russian funds deposited in the bank on the grounds that
the agreement was not ratified by the Senate, and that New York
law gave no validity to the Soviet Union's original ownership and
assignment.
Sutherland regarded the executive agreement as a federal
law superior to all state law."0 It might be inferred, there-
fore, that the President could unilaterally impose embargoes or
lesser restrictions on exports when needed to protect United
States interests in international relations. Yet there is enough
qualifying language in both Curtiss Wright and Belmont to sug-
gest that such Presidential action would require Congressional ac-
quiescence at a minimum. Broad as the Presidential foreign af-
fairs power may be, Sutherland conceded that Presdential power
"must be exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions
of the Constitution."8' The express constitutional allocation of the
authority to regulate foreign commerce to Congress might there-
fore require obedience to a Congressional mandate to regulate ex-
ports only in a particular fashion. Moreover, Belmont left unclear
the extent of the President's power to take actions having the ef-
fect of domestic law, since the executive agreement in that case
did not impair any recognized property right of United States na-
tionals. The Court was able to avoid a Fifth Amendment taking
challenge to the assignment because the defendant bank had no
interest in the funds beyond that of a custodian.2 Whether Presi-
dential action could affect the rights and property interests of
Americans without supporting Congressional legislation was not
decided.
7' 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
Id. at 331-32.
" 299 U.S. at 320. The "applicable provisions," however, may include only those provi-
sions of the constitution specifically directed at foreign affairs, such as the treaty making
procedure. Levitan, supra note 69, at 490. Hence, individual rights such as due process
would not necessarily limit foreign affairs powers under Sutherland's view.
1 301 U.S. at 322.
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The broadest implications of Curtiss Wright and Belmont have
since been pared by a more balanced view of the respective roles
of Congress and the President. The prevailing theory is that the
foreign affairs powers are shared by the President and Congress
in a relationship in which Congress is preeminent. 3 Although it
may appear from time to time that the President exerts dominant
authority in foreign affairs, the appearance results from a tem-
porary failure of Congressional action, rather than Congressional
powerlessness. This modern view may be traced to Justice
Jackson's concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer."4 The majority opinion in that case denied that the in-
herent power of the President enabled him to seize property in
the interest of national security without legislative authorization.
Jackson, however, admitted that under certain circumstances the
seizure of private property might be accomplished by unilateral
Presidential action. There exist, wrote Jackson, areas of overlap-
ping Congressional and Presidential authority. Drastic measures
taken to protect the nation from external threats may fall within a
region of shared responsibility. Where Congress has neither acted
nor expressed its will in a matter of shared responsibility, the
President may act in accordance with the outermost limits of his
authority. If Congress has legislated against Presidential action,
or expressed its disapproval by voting down authorizing legisla-
tion, presidential power is at low ebb, consisting only of the con-
stitutional power of the President minus Congressional authority
over the same matter. On the other hand, the President's power is
at its zenith where he acts in cooperation with Congress. 5
Following the Congressional-dominance theory of Jackson, Con-
gressional statements of policy and precedure regarding export
regulation, enacted into legislation, are fully binding on the Presi-
dent. As an exercise of the commerce power, export regulation is
primarily a Congressional function. Even if export regulation was
tied to a general foreign affairs power free of any specific consti-
tutional provision, the Commerce Clause would give Congress a
Berger, The Presidential Monopoly of Foreign Relations, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1972);
Lofgren, note 69 supra; Van Alstyne, The Role Determining Incidental Powers of the
President and the Federal Courts: A Comment on the Horizontal Effect of 'the Sweeping
Clause,' 36 OHIO ST. L. REV. 788 (1975).
343 U.S. 579 (1952).
Id. at 635-38 (Jackson, J. concurring). See also Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 128-29
(1958), suggesting that what the President may not do alone in the interest of national
security might be accomplished by the combined actions of the President and Congress.
19791
GA. J. INT'L. & COMP. L.
share of the authority. Without the concurrence or acquiescence
of Congress, the President could not restrict American exports by
any Presidential foreign affairs power."6
Nor may the President supplement the regulatory scheme by
taking action not in direct conflict with the EAA but inconsistent
with the general intent of the Act. It is a corollary to Jackson's
theory of Congressional preeminence that Congressional action
preempts all inconsistent Presidential action.8 7 The issue of Con-
gressional preemption poses many of the same questions long faced
by the courts when asked to determine whether federal commerce
power enactments preempt state law. A useful standard is sug-
gested by Hines v. Davidowitz,"s where the Court framed the
preemption issue as whether state law "stands as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objec-
tives of Congress." 9 Thus, in the administration of export restric-
tions, the President is bound by the procedural safeguards and
policy objectives enacted by Congress. Any deviation by the
President from the EAA which tended to frustrate Congressional
objectives would be an unconstitutional usurpation of power. By
the same delegation of authority which enhances the President's
power, his power is also restricted.
C. Separation of Powers
To speak of one or the other political branches as being "domi-
nant" in regulating strategic exports is of use only in resolving
isolated points of conflict between the President and Congress.
Though their functions may be separate and their interests often
in conflict, the Congress and the President are interdependent.
Sustained opposition between branches would immobilize the
government. This interdependency arises from the separtion of
powers principle whereby the essential functions of government
are allocated to separate organs. The separation of powers doc-
" Cf. United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc. 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953), aff'd 348 U.S. 296
(1955).
'" Id But see Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136 (D.C.
Cir. 1974), where the court upheld an executive agreement restricting imports from Japan
although the agreement bypassed procedures for trade adjustments authorized by Congres-
sional legislation. The agreement was a voluntary arrangement between the United States
and Japan and was not domestically enforceable. Because it lacked the power of law, the
agreement was not a legislative action in conflict with Congressional authority.
" 312 U.S. 52 (1940).
" Id. at 67.
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trine serves two purposes. First, it ensures that each government
function is exercised primarily by the institution that is peculiarly
suited to perform the function in a fair and efficient manner.
Declarations of policy are the function of Congress, which alone of
the three branches is representative of many diverse national in-
terests and is most responsive to the public." Execution of the law
is the function of the President, whose efficiency and singleness of
mind are needed to implement the policy declared by Congress.91
Where the government undertakes focused deprivations of in-
dividual interests, the procedural safeguards characteristic of the
courts qualify the judicial branch as the most appropriate forum
to hear complaints against the government action."
Second, the separation of powers guards against the abuse of
government power and invasion of state or individual rights by
preventing a combination of each needed function within a single
institution. Montesquieu, who is credited with first developing the
theory of separation of powers, was primarily concerned with the
danger of concentrated power:
When the legislative and executive powers are united in the
same person ... there can be no liberty; because apprehensions
may arise, lest the same monarch . . . should enact tyrannical
laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner.93
A pure separation of powers, however, was not intended by the
drafters of the constitution,9" and the overlap of functions between
the three branches grew as the nation confronted new and unfore-
seen needs for which the three branches in their pure, original
form were ill-equipped. Perhaps the most useful technique devised
to tackle especially complex problems has been the delegation of
Congressional authority.
By assigning its law-making function to a more specialized body,
Congress promotes a more educated law-making process in areas
where expertise is vitally important, and a more continuous,
penetrating vigilance where rapidly changing circumstances re-
quire constant attention. The power to legislate may also be
delegated to the President, to be exercised by him or his officers.
" Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 626 (1963) (Harlan, J. dissenting); THE FEDERALIST
NO. 70 (A. Hamilton).
91 THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (A. Hamilton).
2 L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 474-563 (1978).
3 MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, Bk. XI, ch. 6, at 151-52 (Hafner ed. 1949).
" THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (J. Madison).
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The advantage of delegations to the executive branch rather than
to an independent body may lie in the capacity of the President to
coordinate the objectives of the delegation with other government
operations. Indeed, the coordinating function of the President, in-
cluding the responsibility to resolve conflicting legislation, is
arguably one facet of the President's powers under the Constitu-
tion.95
In the field of international relations, there is a special need to
anchor delegated authority to the President. Since international
relations are far too complicated and mercurial to be approached
with only a legislated foreign policy, Presidential policy-making is
an essential complement to Congressional policy. The EAA il-
lustrates the practical deference of Congress to the President in
foreign policy. In its declaration of policy, the EAA asserts two
objectives formulated by Congressional deliberations -to use ex-
port restraints as leverage to force the removal of trade restric-
tions of other nations, and to discourage support for "international
terrorism." Even these Congressional objectives are too vague as
mere policy statements to be implemented without substantial
rulemaking and discretion by the Executive branch. To sweep in
all other foreign policy objectives, of whatever branch, the EAA
declares that export controls are to be used "to further
significantly the foreign policy of the United States and fulfill its
international responsibilities. . ." and to protect "the national
security of the United States." These latter objectives are not
Congressional policy statements at all but a license to the Presi-
dent to use export controls to implement a Presidential policy.
Very broad assignments of legislative authority pose a
challenge to the separation of powers doctrine -a challenge which
has not gone unnoticed by the courts. Especially when combined
with an authorization to adjudicate, the delegation to the ex-
ecutive branch of the power to legislate yields the concentration
of power which is the antithesis of separation of powers. The early
response of the Supreme Court was that such a delegation is un-
constitutional. In Field v. Clark," the Court declared, "[t]hat Con-
gress cannot delegate legislative power to the President is a prin-
ciple universally recognized as vital to the integrity and main-
" "The constitution directs the President to take care that the laws be faithfully ex-
ecuted .. " U.S. Const. art. II, § 3. The theory of the president's authority to harmonize
federal law is advanced but rejected in Buff, Presidential Power and Administrative Rule-
making, 88 YALE L. J. 451, 462-69 (1979).
143 U.S. 649 (1892).
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tenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitu-
tion."'97 Nevertheless, the Court upheld a statute which authorized
the President to levy specified duties upon his finding that the na-
tion of origin had applied inequitable duties against American pro-
ducts. "The true distinction," the Court reasoned, "is between the
delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a
discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or dis-
cretion as to its execution.... The first cannot be done; to the lat-
ter no valid objection can be made."98 Portending Sutherland's
Curtiss Wright opinion, the Court also reviewed the long history
of broad Congressional authorization to the President to use his
discretion in the regulation of international commerce, and in-
dicated a possible exception to the nondelegation principle in the
field of foreign affairs.
While some of these [legislative] precedents are stronger than
others, in their application of the case before us, they all show
that, in the judgment of the legislative branch of government, it
is often desirable, if not essential, for the protection of the in-
terests of our people, against the unfriendly or discriminating
regulations established by foreign governments, in the interests
of their people, to invest the President with large discretion in
matters arising out of the execution of statutes relating to trade
and commerce with other nations.99
Despite numerous subsequent intonations of the nondelegation
doctrine, only two delegations of legislative authority have been
invalidated by the Court. Strict adherenece to the nondelegation
doctrine would have blocked the growth of modern regulatory in-
stitutions which today are generally regarded as essential to the
economic and social life of the nation. The technical distinction of
Field v. Clark, that mere discretion in the manner of executing a
law is not an authorization to make law, was insufficient in itself
to save the rulemaking administrative agencies created by Con-
gress in the twentieth century. Authorizations to regulate an in-
dustry "in the public interest" '0 necessarily required the agency
to make law if regulation was to occur in any principled, rational
fashion. For a time the judical response was to look the other way.
Id. at 650.
" Id. at 693-94, quoting Cincinnati, Wilmington R.R. v. Commissioners, 1 Ohio St. 88.
Id. at 690-91 (emphasis added).
tO See, e.g., Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 303, 307(a), 307(d), 309(a), 310, 312
(1970).
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"The authority to make administrative rules is not a delegation of
legislative power," was the answer of one court.' 1 Judicial reluc-
tance to state the issue in more realistic and precise terms led
first to uncertainty, and then to public outcry when the Supreme
Court used the nondelegation doctrine to strike down two cor-
nerstones of Roosevelt's New Deal legislation in the course of a
single year.'
A new approach to the problem of delegated authority was
signaled in Yakus v. United States,'°3 a case which upheld the
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 and its authorization to a
Price Administrator to fix maximum prices and rents. Discarding
the legislation versus execution distinction of Field, the Court
turned its attention to a new and decisive consideration -the ac-
countability of the agent responsible for the delegated authority.
Congress need retain only the essence of the legislative function,
which is "the determination of the legislative policy and its for-
mulation as a defined and binding rule of conduct . .. "10, The
necessary details of the policy, the rules by which the policy is
translated into enforceable law, may be provided by the agents of
the Congress.
The Constitution as a continuously operative charter of
government does not demand the impossible or the imprac-
ticable. It does not require that Congress find for itself every
fact upon which it desires to base legislative action or that it
make for itself detailed determinations which it has declared to
be prerequisite to the application of the legislative policy to par-
ticular facts and circumstances impossible for Congress itself
properly to investigate. 1 5
Beyond the principle that the "essentials" of legislative action are
constitutionally reserved to Congress, there is a standard of preci-
sion of delegation which assures that the legislative policy will be
respected and enforced by the administrator. That standard is
met when the facts and conditions on which administrative action
must be based are so well defined that the administrator can
know the bounds of his legal authority and be reviewed for com-
101 Sawyer v. United States, 10 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1926).
"' Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
"' 321 U.S. 414 (1943).
Id. at 425.
10 Id. at 424.
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pliance with his legal authority by Congress, the courts and the
public.10° In this manner, the legislative process is never passed
beyond Congressional control, and the constitutional responsibili-
ty of Congress for the resulting body of law is preserved.
The rule of Yakus might have been reserved for delegations of
foreign affairs powers, resting as it did on an exercise of the war
power. Nevertheless, the standard for delegation of legislative
authority has served to greatly broaden the limits within which
agencies of all types may be permitted to act.07 The special
distinction of foreign affairs powers, however, persists. The Court
has continued to recognize that in international relations, Con-
gress may "paint with a brush broader than that it customarily
wields in domestic areas."10 Since no Congressional delegation of
authority since Yakus has been invalidated it can only be guessed
whether a delegation too indefinite in terms to survive in the
domestic field could in fact prevail for purposes of foreign affairs.
There are reasons for such a distinction beyond mere ad-
ministrative necessity. While the separation of powers doctrine
suggests that it is for Congress alone to declare domestic policy
with the force of law, international policy is subject to the concur-
rent authority of Congress and the President. Except to the ex-
tent that Congressional approval is needed to provide the Presi-
dent with authority to regulate the liberty and property of
Americans, Congressional policies in international relations act
more as restraints on Presidential action than as grants of
authority. In many instances, an independent basis for Presiden-
tial action may be found in the President's enummerated constitu-
tional powers."°
The EAA achieves the minimum standards of the modern
nondelegation doctrine only if it is conceded that a lesser degree
of precision is allowed in matters of international relations. The
direction that export controls be used to promote the national
security of the United States is arguably within the standard of
Yakus, for the EAA further states that the guiding policy for this
purpose is that exports which may contribute to the military
'I Id. at 426.
117 See, e.g., Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971)
(upholding peacetime price controls).
'" Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965).
00 In his responsibilities as Commander in Chief, U.S. CONST. art. 2, §2, cl. 1, and as trea-
ty negotiator, id., the President is often required to make very broad judgments of foreign
policy.
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potential of any nation threatening the security of the United
States must be restricted. The identificiation of unfriendly nations
or the possibility that an export may contribute to the military
potential of those nations necessarily involves very wide discre-
tion, but not a discretion greater than that presently vested in
some domestic regulators." The direction that export controls be
used to promote the foreign policy of the United States, however,
does not identify United States policy. Only on the strength of the
President's independent authority to make policy ab initio can
this delegation be supported.
If the President enjoys an independent authority to make
foreign policy, it might well be asked whether any Congressional
policy standards are necessary in a delegation of foreign affairs
powers. Considering the natural weaknesses of Congress in
foreign affairs, too much Congressional involvement may be
destructive of an intelligent, coordinated foreign policy command-
ed by a single executive officer. The unmanageable size of Con-
gress and its lack of leadership and confidentiality are frequently
cited by critics of Congressional foreign policy making. Alexis de
Tocqueville doubted the wisdom of democratic foreign policy-
making long before the age of push-button wars.
Foreign politics demand scarcely any of those qualities which
a democracy possess; and they require, on the contrary, the
perfect use of almost all those faculties in which it is deficient....
[A] democracy is unable to regulate the details of an important
undertaking, to perservere in a design, and to work out its ex-
ecution in the presence of serious obstacles. It cannot combine
its measures with secrecy, and it will not await their conse-
quences with patience. These are qualities which more especially
belong to an individual or to an aristocracy; and they are pre-
cisely the means by which an individual people attains to a pre-
dominant position."'
Nevertheless, Congress has special strengths not possessed by
the President. Congress is more broadly representative of the
il' See, e.g., New York Central Securities Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12 (1932),
decided under the narrower, pre-Yakus nondelegation rule but upholding the authority of
the Interstate Commerce Commission to approve the acquisition of one railroad by another
whenever it "will be in the public interest." But see United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258,
272-73 (1967) (Brennan, J. dissenting). Justice Brennan found insufficient for lack of
legislative standards a delegation of authority to the Secretary of Defense to determine
what is "a defense facility."
"I A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 236-37 (H. Reeve trans. 1835).
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people and hence more likely to reflect public values. Consultation
between the President and Congress may be impractical for crises
requiring immediate action, or for the details of foreign policy ad-
ministration, but when a continuing regulatory device such as the
EAA is established to attain foreign policy objectives, Congress
can make a positive contribution in setting the bearings of policy.
It will often be necessary for the President to exercise his power
of initiative to take immediately needed military or diplomatic ac-
tion. Export restrictions, however, will seldom be required as a
tool for new Presidential policies before the consent of Congress
can be gained. The weaknesses of Congress as an institution call
for Congressional flexibility, but not abdication.
Congressional participation in the making of the policies govern-
ing the use of export restrictions may be especially useful in
several respects. If the purpose of an export restriction against a
particular nation is to serve as a demonstration of national will,
Congressional approval of the restriction would add strength to
the message. ' Moreover, policy decisions which have a direct im-
pact on domestic interests must not be made by an executive
branch oblivious to the internal repercussions of its actions.
Foreign affairs actions having domestic effect require the lawmak-
ing authority of Congress to assure that the affected interests will
have some reasonable chance to be heard.
IV. ACCOUNTABILITY BY OVERSIGHT
A. Congressional Review
1. The need for congressional review. The principles of
separation of powers require that each branch maintain vigilance
over the others. The role of Congress on this scheme of checks
and balances is to be watchful over the execution of its laws to in-
sure that its mandate is followed properly. When Congress
assigns its legislative authority to the executive branch, the need
for continuous oversight is of even greater importance. If the law
leaves no great discretion in the executive branch, only the in-
tegrity of the law is at stake. As executive discretion becomes
broader, the very balance of power between the three branches is
threatened. The standard of accountability announced in Yakus
.' See Rubin, United States Export Controls: An Immodest Proposal 36 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 637 (1968).
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seeks to restore Congressional preeminence by requiring measur-
ing sticks of executive performance. Apart from the duty of over-
sight which follows from the separation of powers, there is an
obligation of Congress as a public forum to remain responsive to
the public welfare, and to correct, stengthen or repeal laws which
the public observes to be weak or contrary to the public interest.
This obligation is no less if the authority to make law is exercised
in fact by independent or executive agencies rather than Con-
gress. The modern tendency of Congress to delegate lawmaking
authority as well as executive authority casts that branch more
and more in the role of an overseer of the lawmaking functions of
other bodies. The broadened oversight role has been commended
by some writers. John Stuart Mill prophesied this development in
representative democracies in his treatise, Representative
Government:
Instead of the function of governing, for which it is radically
unfit, the proper office of a representative assembly is to watch
and control government; to throw the light of publicity on its
acts; to compel a full exposition and justification of all of them
which any one considers questionable; to censure them if found
condemnable, and, if the men who compose the government
abuse their trust, or fulfill it in a manner which conflicts with
the deliberate sense of the nation, to expel them from office, and
either expressely or virtually appoint their successors."3
As Congress moves ever nearer to Mill's vision of the modern
representative assembly, new questions are posed concerning the
ability of Congress as an overseer of the making and execution of
law. In order to preserve the values of separation of powers, Con-
gress must retrieve its ultimate responsibility for the state of the
law, whether promulgated by it or its created agencies. This
responsibility cannot be maintained if the agency, armed with a
far reaching mandate, is set adrift with no substantial ties back to
Congress. Unfortunately, Congress lacks the attentiveness of an
executive administrator. Its habit, described by one Senator, is to
react from one imminent crisis to the next."1 Yet the oversight
function may require much of the learning and circumspection
which Congress first sought to avoid by delegating authority, and
J' j. S. MILL, UTILITARIANISM, LIBERTY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 239 (1910).




as the number of broadly empowered agencies proliferates, the
resources and competence of Congress are spread thin.
Certainly Congress is not alone in the oversight role; it is joined
by the courts, the President and the public. The effectiveness of
these other overseers, however, is confined by the limits of their
power and zealousness, and these limits are felt most in the
foreign affairs and national security areas. The courts are least
zealous in their review of agency action where the foreign affairs
or national security powers are concerned, and in any event can
only correct a transgression of the authority described in the Act.
The President, like Congress, is unlikely to possess the energy
needed for general surveillance of the agency, and may be
situated in a policy position antagonistic to Congress. The general
public lacks any meaningful opportunity for participation, since in-
formation about the agency is easily accessible only to a small and
sophisticated circle of government officials and industry represen-
tatives. Even the regulated public may be severely hampered in
its efforts to evaluate the responsible agency. Since agencies
charged with responsibility for foreign affairs and national securi-
ty may dispense with procedures for public participation common
to domestic regulatory processes, those members of the public
who are most concerned with regulation are often deprived of the
most important means of oversight. Only Congress has both the
incentive to protect the integrity of its mandates and the power to
redirect the course of agency action with new legislation.
2. The implements of oversight. In order to meet the demands
of its extensive oversight duties, Congress is divided into
specialized committees which are devoted to the review of those
agencies that are within the range of the committees' concern."5
Committee oversight contributes greatly to the efficiency of Con-
gress. In addition to allowing individual congressmen to specialize
in particular fields and promote the competence of Congress as a
whole, the division of Congress into committees permits
simultaneous review of numerous government operations. The
devolution of the oversight function to the committees, however,
detracts from one of the chief values of Congressional oversight,
which is the provision of a representative forum.
Even with the aid of the committees, a continuous dialoge be-
tween Congress and the agencies is impossible. Under the EAA,
I15 For a general description and criticism of committee oversight, see Bruff, Presidential
Power and Administrative Rulemaking, 88 YALE L. J. 451, 456-57 (1979).
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for example, there are four possible occasions for formal review
by the Congressional committees. The first is the pending expira-
tion of the President's authority under the Act."' The authority
generally must be renewed at three year intervals, and the hear-
ings which are preparatory to a renewal of authority offer the
most effective opportunity for review."7 The second occasion for
committee hearings is the budgetary authorization process."8
Authorizations are made during two year intervals, but budget-
ary hearings are typically limited to the need for increments in
agency spending. Only where the budgetary authorization is in-
separable from policy, as in the case of foreign aid, are issues of
policy and performance likely to be raised at this stage."9 The
third occasion for committee hearings is the proposal of new legis-
lation. In practice, however, amendments to the EAA have been
enacted or seriously considered only during the renewal of
authority stage, a pattern which suggests that the concerned com-
mittees prefer to reserve their energies for the intense renewal
hearings occuring at three year intervals. Finally, hearings may
be scheduled to consider the President's nomination of candidates
to fill the official positions responsible for export licensing. This
opportunity for review appears to have been of no consequence,
and the record of Congressional confirmations in general displays
more indifference than oversight. 20 Moreover, the President may
delegate authority to agencies whose chief officer is not subject to
Senate confirmation. The growing involvement of the National
Security Council in the export regulation system has already
threatened to obscure oversight of the executive branch via the
appointments process. 2 ' In sum, the link of accountability be-
tween Congress and the OEA is effectively reconnected only at
the three year intervals when renewal of the Act is again under
consideration.
"' 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 2412 (Cum. Supp. 1978). The current act expires September 30,
1979. Hearings for the renewal of authority are underway as of this writing.
.. See, e.g., 1976 House Hearings, supra note 4.
11 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 2411(a) (Cum. Supp. 1978). Before the EAA was amended in 1977,
Act of June 22, 1977, Pub. L. 95-52, § 102, 91 Stat. 235, funds were appropriated annually
without an authorizing process. The purpose of the budgetary authorization provision was
to improve Congressional oversight. H.R. REP. No. 190, supra note 30, 33 at 7.
19 Bruff, supra note 115, at 457-58.
Id. at 458.
121 See 1979 House Hearings, supra note 55 (statement of F. Huszagh, G. Bertsch and J.
McIntyre); Export Administration Act: Agenda for Reform: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Int'l Economic Policy and Trade of the House Comm. on Int'l Relations, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1978) (statement of J. Gray) [hereinafter cited as 1978 House Hearings].
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In their frustration with the lack of responsiveness within the
export regulatory system, exporters have occasionaly sought
redress through informal Congressional oversight. By enlisting
the aid of individual Congressmen, exporters can mobilize political
pressure for the approval of specific export transactions.1" While
Congressional intercession is often salutary, intercession cannot
take the place of formal oversight. For the many small exporters
who lack influence in Washington, intercession is not an available
strategy. When individual Congressmen do intercede on behalf of
their constituents, the result is something unintended in either
the legislative or administrative process. Congressmen are
elected not to adjudicate but to represent the public in the law-
making process. Congress acting as a body serves democratic
principles. If Congressional oversight is left to individual action,
however, the necessary accountability of government to a na-
tionally distributed political base is lost. A growing discontent
among the courts with ex parte communications between adver-
sary parties or lobbyists and decision making bodies may also
ultimately curtail the usefulness of Congressional intercession."
3. The barriers to oversight. Congressional oversight of OEA
activities is made more difficult by the poorly defined policy objec-
tives of strategic export regulation and the secrecy of the
regulatory process. By authorizing the President to use regulation
to achieve foreign policy goals of his own making, Congress has
left itself without any standard by which to measure compliance
with the Act. Oversight of the President's objectives and perfor-
mance can only amount to an after the fact questioning of the
wisdom of his established policy. Without standards, Congress
must judge the success of the administration's regulation of ex-
ports according to the administration's objectives. Meaningful
oversight of regulations based on foreign policy requires the in-
volvement of Congress in the making of foreign policy. The EAA
in itself provides no avenue for this involvement.
Many of the difficulties of Congressional oversight lie not
" See, e.g., UNITED STATES EXPORT WEEKLY, June 6, 1978, at A-6 (intercession by
Wisconsin legislators on behalf of local truck manufacturer); Hearings on Export Licensing
reprinted in UNITED STATES EXPORT WEEKLY, June 20, 1978, at M-5, 6 (statement of E. Loef-
fler).
"' See generally Comment, Judicial Limitation of Congressional Influence on Ad-
ministrative Agencies, 73 Nw. L. REV. 931 (1979). For an argument in favor of intercession
by legislators, see Reinstein & Silvergate, Legislative Privilege and the Separation of
Powers, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1113, 1163-64 (1973).
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within Congress but in the structure of the executive branch.
Although the administration of the EAA is centralized in the
OEA, the authority to intervene and affect the outcome of any
regulatory decision is scattered throughout the executive
branch. 2' The EAA itself grants to the Secretary of Defense a vir-
tual veto power over any export license application which is of
any potential military significance. The State Department holds a
vote in the Operating Committee, and by reason of the customary
unanimity requirement, also wields a veto power. Of more uncer-
tain authority are those executive branch agencies and depart-
ments which stand at the periphery of the strategic licensing pro-
cess. The Operating Committee consults freely with any govern-
ment agency having a legitimate interest in the particular export
item. Both the National Security Council and the Department of
Energy have recently enjoyed increasing influence. Occassionally
these outside agencies intervene with great political force. The
mode of consultation and intervention takes no formal or
regularized form, and the view of outsiders is that the regulatory
process is apparently a chaos where the issues are hotly con-
tested. In one controversial case,1" an application to export oil
drilling equipment to the U.S.S.R. reached the President's desk
after a failure of the interagency group to achieve unanimity.
Following the President's "final" approval of the license-and
after the exporter had begun to execute the contract -the objec-
ting federal agencies intervened again and were successful in
gaining a revocation of the license. A second review by the Presi-
dent resulted in yet another license approval and opposition to the
export subsided. In the numerous contested cases which never
reach the Presidential level, the veto power of the principal agency
participants delays licensing decisions and prevents a rational
balancing of national interests."
The dispersal of authority among these assorted departments of
the government frustrates Congressional oversight by obscuring
responsibility for the administration of the Act. The very pur-
poses of concentrating authority in the President- coordination of
operations and focused accountability-are lost bythe assignment
of authority to separate agencies. If the President were to hold
12, See text at notes 17-19 and 41-47, supra.
' See UNITED STATES EXPORT WEEKLY, August 12, 1978, at A-1.




tight reins over the administration of the Act, these diffused
powers might be held in check. However, only a small fraction of
licenses receive significant Presidential consideration, and it is
doubtful that the President could reasonably devote greater per-
sonal energies to the problem. The human limitations of the office
compel the President to adopt the compromises worked out below
in the bulk of all cases.
The result, in terms of accountability, is what Alexander
Hamilton described as the problem of "magistrates of equal
dignity":
It often becomes impossible, amidst mutual accusations, to
determine on whom the blame or the punishment of a pernicious
measure, or a series of pernicious measures ought really to fall.
It is shifted from one to another with so much dexterity, and
under such plausible appearances, that the public opinion is left
in suspense about the real author. The circumstances which may
have led to any national miscarriage or misfortune are
sometimes so complicated, that where there are a number of
actors who may have had different degrees and kinds of agency,
though we may clearly see upon the whole that there has been
mismanagement, yet it may be impracticable to pronounce to
whose account the evil which may have been incurred is truly
chargeable."
The difficulty of tracing the source of delays and erroneous judg-
ment within the export licensing process attests to these observa-
tions. A number of departments bear responsibility for each deci-
sion. Neither the indecisiveness and unpredictability of the pro-
cess, nor the potentially distorted compromises which the process
produces can be blamed on any single actor.
The difficulty of Congressional supervision in this situation is
compounded by the fragmentation of Congress into oversight com-
mittees. Those committees vested with responsibility for over-
sight of the OEA may have only marginal influence over other in-
tervening agencies. The policies which each agency seeks to im-
plement through export regulation may be developed apart from
the export regulation process in offices which respond to different
Congressional committees. Since these policies are often
developed in advance of any consideration of export regulation
possibilities, the committees concerned with export regulation
may be cut off from the most critical stage of review.
'" THE FEDERALIST No. 70 (A. Hamilton).
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4. Enforcement of congressional policy. If oversight is not to
be a meaningless exercise, Congress must make its stated policies
effective within the administrative system. Experience with the
EAA demonstrates that law is not easily translated into action in
the bureaucracy. After twice amending the EAA to establish time
limits on the processing of license applications, delay in the ap-
proval of licenses continues to grow. In part this is due to the
weak statutory language used by Congress." Any remedy for the
aggrieved parties is precluded by the wide discretionary powers
granted to the responsible agencies to ignore the time limits.'"
One lesson from the delay problem is that Congress cannot rely on
its spoken word to be self-executing. Oversight is a joint operation
between Congress and the public, but unless the regulated public
is armed with a remedy, the enforcement side of the oversight
function is likely to fail. As will be seen, the traditional principles
of due process may provide an effective means of enforcing Con-
gressional intent and restoring accountability directly from the
agency to the public.
B. Presidential Oversight
The delegation of authority to the President to regulate
strategic exports carries with it the responsibility for the manner
in which that authority is exercised. Whether the powers con-
ferred by the EAA are exercised directly by the President or
through his subordinates, the delegation envisions that the Presi-
dent shall serve as the central locus of executive authority under
the Act. Presidential responsibility facilitates congressional over-
sight, since supervision of a single officer having command of an
entire operation is likely to be more rational and less confused
than supervision of numerous independent officers of equal
stature and inconsistent goals. Moreover, Presidential oversight
adds a second layer of accountability which may compensate for
the failure of effective oversight by Congress. As the President,
like Congress, must appeal to the voting public, his office may be
viewed as a surrogate forum for the weighing of national in-
terests.1 30 Unlike Congress, which simultaneously represents a
great number of interests, the President serves a national consti-
tuency and therefore represents only the common denominator of
' See notes 55 and 56 supra.
50 U.S.C.A. App. §2403(g)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1978).
'8' Bruff, supra note 115, at 461-62.
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the national interest. Congress is, for this reason, the preferred
forum for the weighing of interests, but where Congress has
delegated its authority to pronounce public policy, the President
may serve as an acceptable delegate where an appointed official
would not. It is at least questionable whether the courts would
countenance a Congressional authorization to the Secretary of
State to make foreign policy. 3' A like authorization to the Presi-
dent under the EAA, however, has survived without challenge.
The accountability of the President to the public is a basis for the
courts' deference to his "political" decisions in matters of foreign
relations and national security, for the President, much more than
the courts, can claim to represent the public interest, and his
policies are better tested by the voters than by appointed
judges."2
However well the political connection between the President
and the public may work in the case of major issues of national in-
terest, the President's accountability to the public in his ad-
ministration of the EAA is minimal. Strategic export regulation is
not likely to capture the public's attention. News coverage of ex-
port regulation is largely confined to a small number of services
read only by specialists in the field. If the Act was administered
personally by the President, the story might be different. Instead,
the President manages only brief and infrequent forays into ex-
port regulation and leaves all other decisions to the bureaucracy.
Nor will the public hold him accountable for actions taken at the
lower levels of the executive branch. Only the actions of his
closest subordinates are normally attributed to the President."3
The lack of Presidential control of export regulation is all the
more troubling because there is no single subordinate who exer-
cises central authority. There are, rather, a series of agency ad-
vocates working toward different ends. While interagency conflict
is sometimes desirable as a means of creating an adversarial set-
ting for discussion of policy," it can also be destructive of rational
131 An appointed officer would lack any claim to constitutional powers to make policy, and
would therefore be required to rely on a delegation of power from either Congress or the
President. The delegation would be limited by the Yakus principle of accountability, and
therefore could not be so broad as an authorization to make "foreign policy." Cf. Freedman,
Administrative Procedure and the Control of Foreign Direct Investment, 119 U. PA. L.
REV. 1, 26 (1970).
.S Chicago & Southern Airlines v. Waterman Steamship Co., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948).
'" Cutler & Johnson, Regulation and the Political Process, 84 YALE L. J. 1395, 1410
(1975).
"3 2 Senate Comm. on Government Operations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., Study on Federal
Regulation 10 (Comm. Print 1977).
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decision making. The balancing and accomodation of national in-
terests which ought to occur in interagency deliberations under
the EAA has been complicated by the unanimity rule, which
allows any single interest to obstruct all competing interests. Ef-
fective policy leadership from the top might promote greater har-
mony in the export regulation process, but such leadership has
not been provided. Hence, the coordination and accomodation of
government regulatory objectives which was sought by delega-
tion to the President has not been achieved.
C. Judicial Oversight
1. Review of authority. Judicial oversight of administrative
agencies engaged in rulemaking and policy functions serves as the
third leg of the Yakus accountability standard. Unlike Congress or
the President, the courts normally do not concern themselves
with the quality of agency action. Rather, they monitor the con-
sistency of agency performance with agency authority. Agency
authority is typically judged according to two statutory
guidelines: 1) the legislative enactments which established and en-
powered the agency, and 2) the procedural requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act.'35 Since the EAA exempts export
regulation from the Administrative Procedure Act,'" however,
one must look solely to the EAA for the measure of the Execu-
tive's statutory authority to control exports. The EAA is singular-
ly inadequate for this purpose.
The bases of agency-formulated objectives under the EAA are
immune from judicial review provided the Executive branch
can present a colorable claim of foreign policy or national security.
This result inheres in the foreign affairs character of export
regulation, and in the EAA's declaration of goals that can be defined
only in the ongoing political currents of the executive branch.
Decisions about what nations are dangerous to our national securi-
ty, or whether governments engaged in human rights violations
should be punished are classic examples of issues that the courts
have found to be "nonjusticiable" under the political question doc-
trine. "'37
Action taken by the executive based on foreign affairs pow-
ers may be challenged as unauthorized by law where statu-
3 5 U.S.C. §§551-559 (1976).
" 50 U.S.C.A. App. §2407 exempts the EAA from all but section 552, dealing with public
access to agency documents.
137 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211-14 (1962).
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tory limitations are clearly exceeded,' 3' or where the action has a
necessary factual foundation that is plainly missing.139 The EAA,
however, imposes no effective limits on the purposes for which ex-
port controls might be used because it permits the use of controls
for any foreign policy. Nor do the national security objectives of the
EAA require any specific factual basis for the imposition of controls,
since any amount of trade with a foreign nation may enhance the
economic strength of the importer or allow it to shift its economic
resources toward the production of military equipment.14 As long
as American goods are superior in quality to those of competing
foreign goods, or overriding national security interests are
asserted, the requirement that the restricted commodity must not
be one which is freely available may be overcome by the Ex-
ecutive Branch."' The decision to restrict exports of oil drilling
equipment to the Soviet Union,"2 for example, may have been
founded on the thought that any technology contributing to the
economic growth of the Soviet Union would indirectly benefit
Soviet military forces. Exporters may reasonably question
whether an oil-hungry Soviet Union will be more pacific than an
energy rich Soviet Union, but such a challenge will not succeed in
overcoming the minimum rationality required of political or policy
judgments. Congress apparently hoped that restricted exports
would bear more than a slight and indirect relationship to military
potential, since it directed that export controls should be applied
to "goods and technology which would make a significant con-
tribution to the military potential of any other nation .... 143 The
courts, however, are likely to choose not to make independent
judgments about what is "significant" in matters of national
security.
Some scholars have urged that more rigorous judicial review
may be appropriate where policy decisions are made by politically
anonymous officials in the bureaucracy. " As Presidential oversight
138 Id.; Pan American World Airways, Inc., v. C.A.B., 392 F.2d 483, 492 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
139 A required factual basis may be found underlying even independent constitutional
powers of the executive branch. Certain actions taken by the exercise of war powers, for
example, must be based on a finding of active hostilities. Charleston Corp. v. Sinclair, 264
U.S. 543, 547-48 (1924), quoted in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 214 (1962); Sterling v. Con-
stantin, 287 U.S. 378, 399-401 (1932).
140 Bertsch, supra note 48, at 11-12.
... 50 U.S.C.A. App. §2403(b)(2)(B) (Cum. Supp. 1978).
142 43 Fed. Reg. 33,699 (1978) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. §397.4).
143 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 2402(1)(B) (Cum. Supp. 1978) (emphasis added).
14 E.g., McDermott, The Foreign Direct Investment Controls, 11 HARV. INT'L L. J. 490,
543-44 (1970). See also Freedman, note 131 supra, at 26.
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becomes increasingly ineffective, the argument that the courts
must defer to the politically accountable branch in matters of
policy becomes less compelling. But the political question doctrine
also rests on the difficulty of finding judicial standards by which
to judge questions of policy."' Judicial review must therefore be
limited to the procedural adequacy and authority of executive
branch decisions.
2. Review of findings of fact. Judicial review of the ad-
ministration of the EAA might be made more effective if the fac-
tual foundation of each agency decision could be separated from
the policy foundation. For example, the availability of foreign
sources of supply that would negate the effect of United States
controls is not a political question but a question of fact. Similarily,
the issue of the military usefulness of a commodity must have a
basis in fact. If these issues could be clearly defined as the essen-
tial foundation of agency action, or were required as a foundation
for any agency action, the courts could then test the evidentiary
support for the decision to restrict a particular export. Substan-
tive review of the decision under the statutory, "unsupported by
substantial evidence" standard ordinarily appropriate in judicial
review of administrative adjudications"' is precluded by a special
exemption for the EAA,'47 but the rationality of the agency deci-
sion must nonetheless pass constitutional muster under the rule
that agency action must not be arbitrary or capricious.'48
Unfortunately, no record of the administrative process leading
to the decision and no statement of the particular reasons for deci-
sion are available for review under the EAA. The difficulties faced
by the challenging exporter in supporting a claim of arbitrariness
are therefore virtually insurmountable. In Daedalus Enterprises,
Inc. v. Kreps,49 a manufacturer of remote sensing equipment
sought an order to compel the Department of Commerce to issue a
validated license for an export to the People's Republic of China.
Since the specific basis for the decision was unknown, Daedalus
also asked the court to require the Department to disclose the
145 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1961).
,,' 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1976).
50 U.S.C.A. App. § 2407 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
... Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 136-38 (1951) See generally Berger,
Administrative Arbitrariness: A Synthesis, 78 HARV. L. REV. 965 (1969).
... Daedalus Enterprises, Inc. v. Kreps, 78-893 (D.D.D.C. May 18, 1978) reprinted in




reasons for the decision to Daedalus, or in the alternative, to the
court for in camera inspection. Due to the pendency of a hardship
appeal by Daedalus to the Department, the court invoked the rule
for preliminary relief that the plaintiff must demonstrate substan-
tial likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable injury, and the
absence of substantial harm to the public interest. Considering the
last two factors, the court observed:
This court is a court of limited jurisdiction being asked in
this instance to grant extraordinary relief. The sale of remote
sensing equipment and technology to the People's Republic of
China and the impact thereof upon the national security of the
United States raises a political question entrusted to the
jurisdiction of the Executive Branch of the United States....
The public interest mandates that the Executive Branch of
the Government adjudicate and determine the question of what
constitutes national security.'5 °
Though the court in Daedalus may have been correct in assum-
ing that "what constitutes national security" is in part a political
question, the decision that the particular devices are dangerous
also requires a judgment that is based on fact. But the case
demonstrates the helplessness of the courts in reviewing agency
action when agency procedures and legislative guidelines allow
political judgments to serve as an absolute cover for determina-
tions of fact. If policy judgments are not broken down into the fac-
tual conclusions upon which they rest, the political question doc-
trine will sweep aside any opportunity for judicial review.
3. Review of agency procedures. In addition to limitations on
the authority of agencies, enabling legislation typically lays down
specific procedures for agency rulemaking or adjudication, or ap-
plies the procedural rules of the Administrative Procedure Act.
Procedural rules make the agency process more visible, and
therefore better exposed to the oversight of Congress and the
courts. Lacking the supplementary law of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, the EAA offers little guidance for procedural
review. 5 ' In place of the public notice and participation provisions
typical of domestic rulemaking schemes,'52 the EAA requires only
15 Id. (emphasis added)
"' See text at notes 135-36, supra.
,5 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §553 (1976).
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that "the Secretary of Commerce shall use all practicable means
available to him to keep the business sector of the nation fully ap-
prised of changes in export control policy and procedures. . .. "'13
No particular procedure is mandated by the legislation, and the
procedure adopted by the Department of Commerce is without
any formal hearing of either the rulemaking or adjudicative
models.
Although a minimum of procedural safeguards have been in-
troduced for the approval or denial of individual license applica-
tions, the process by which policy is made and the manner in
which it is applied is not outlined by law or regulation. In denying
license applications, the agency need state only the statutory
basis for the decision. Laconic statements explaining that the ap-
plication has been rejected for reasons of national security or
foreign policy suffice under this statutory requirement. Addi-
tional procedural rules are triggered only when the Department
fails to approve or deny a license within ninety days. The most im-
portant of these rules, that the applicant must be informed of the
questions which have been raised by any government agency or
department with regard to the application, allows only written
communication between the applicant and the agency and does
not guarantee an opportunity to examine the opposing evidence.
4. Review of agency effectiveness. The frustration of judicial
oversight via statutory authority and procedure standards is not
unique to the EAA. The inadequacy of these tools for review of
other agencies has led some courts to rely on alternative techn-
niques of review which look to the effectiveness of agency behavior.
In reviewing agency effectiveness, the court may ask what result
Congress intended by enacting certain legislation, and whether
the agency has acted in a manner which, though not in violation of
its statutory authority, has thwarted Congressional objectives.
The remedy in such a case is not invalidation of agency action but
the prescription of new procedures which are "implied" by the
Congressional objectives. In White v. Mathews,"' for example, the
Second Circuit ordered the Social Security Administration to
decide, or accept without further consideration, applications for
disability benefits within a stated time limit, since delays in the
administration of the Act had undermined the very purpose of the
disability program. The court imposed its time limit notwithstand-
50 U.S.C.A. App. § 2403(a)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1978).
559 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1977).
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ing strong evidence of a Congressional intent not to bind the
agency to time limits.
The agency effectiveness standard might be applied to the ex-
port regulation system on the ground that the economic interests
set forth in the EAA have been undermined by delays in the pro-
cessing of license applications. The delays in the approval of
licenses may present an even stronger case than White, since Con-
gress has, in the EAA, expressed its intent that applications be
decided within a stated time limit. If circumstances prevent a
decision within ninety days, the Department may so inform the
applicant and supply the reasons for the Department's hesitancy.
Congress intended that exceptions to the time limit should be
used responsibly, and delays not based on legitimate uncertainty
would violate the purpose of the time limit provision. It is equally
clear, however, that Congress intended to leave the executive
branch with a flexible time frame in which to make its decisions.
To the extent that delay is caused by policy conflict within the
Department of Commerce or the Operating Committee, the statu-
tory language tends to foreclose any judicial remedy. Moreover,
the courts may be hesitant to apply the remedy suggested by
White (automatic approval after expiration of time limit) where
any policy conflict is demonstrated, since uncertainty in a decision
affecting national security might be too high a price to pay for
speedy disposition of export licenses. The effect of a court im-
posed time limit might be to force the Department of Commerce
to summarily deny all applications not yet approved at the
deadline.
5. Judicial review and due process. The possibilities for
judicial intervention in the regulatory process are not exhausted
by these statute-based standards of review. Even before the
delegation theory of Yakus unfolded the courts had begun to
wrestle with administrative government from the different perspec-
tive of due process." As the old restraints on delegation of
legislative authority have loosened, many courts and commen-
tators have noted that the accountability standard often malfunc-
tions. Neither Congressional nor judicial review has succeeded in
effectively controlling agency behavior. In order to restore ac-
15 See, e.g., Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) where the
Court invalidated an overbroad delegation of authority, distinguishing earlier cases of ap-
proved broad delegation in which strict procedural rules served to prevent arbitrary agen-
cy action.
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countability in the absence of precise legislative standards of
authority, the courts have experimented with constitutional stan-
dards of review based on due process. Judge Bazelon, a chief
spokesman for the new common law of administrative procedure,
has pointed to the need for rules by which agencies may be made
self-regulating:
[Jiudicial review alone can correct only the most egregious
abuses. Judicial review must operate to ensure that the ad-
ministrative process itself will confine and control the exercise
of discretion .... When administrators provide a framework for
principled decision-making, the result will be to diminish the im-
portance of judicial review by enhancing the integrity of the ad-
ministrative process, and to improve the quality of judicial
review in those cases where judicial review is sought. '
The concluding section of this paper will examine the basic prin-
ciples of due process and the manner in which these principles
might be applied in the field of export regulation.
V. ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGH DUE PROCESS
A. The Character of Agency Action
Like the separation of powers principles which limit the delega-
tion of Congressional authority, due process serves to reenforce
the values of democratic accountability. At its core, due process
demands that individuals directly and peculiarly affected by
government action must be accorded timely notice of the prospec-
tive action, and an opportunity to present evidence and
arguments on their own behalf.' Due process treats accountability
primarily as an individual matter, by creating an individual right
to participate. But the individualized hearing requirement is not
applied across the board to all government action. Lawmaking ac-
tivity must of necessity be conducted in an informal manner, with
no right of participation except for that of the elected represen-
tatives of the people. When government proceedings are ad-
'"1 Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 598 (1971).
157 L. TRIBE, supra note 92 at 512.
'" See generally, Townsend v. Yeomans, 301 U.S. 441, 451 (1937); Hazard, Representa-
tion in Rule-Making, in LAW AND THE AMERICAN FUTURE 85, 94 (ed. M. Schwartz 1976);
Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197 (1976); Sinaiko, Due Process Rights
of Participation in Administrative Rulemaking, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 886 (1975); TRIBE, supra
note 92, at 474-77.
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judicatory in nature, however, due process requirements attach
with the greatest force.'58 The use of individualized hearings at
the adjudicatory level reflects the thought that responsible
government can be guaranteed only by effective checks against
abuse of discretion in the application of the law as well as the mak-
ing of the law. 59 While the nondelegation principle maintains ac-
countability where law is made, procedural due process maintains
accountability where law is applied. The due process clause of the
constitution can also be explained as an expression of separation
of powers: where government action is essentially adjudicatory,
as opposed to legislative, the action must be carried out in a man-
ner which corresponds to the procedures of the judicial branch.'"
Thus, in defining the content of the due process clause, as it ap-
plies to administrative agency action, the courts have considered
that the rules of procedure fundamental to the courtroom must, in
varying degrees, be practiced by any arm of the government
engaged in an adjudicatory action.
In determining what procedural safeguards might be constitu-
tionally required in the regulation of exports, it is first necessary
to classify the government action involved as either legislative or
adjudicative. The character of administrative action is not always
readily apparent. Agencies often take actions which are neither
purely legislative nor purely adjudicative, but combine the at-
tributes of both government functions. The courts have relied
from time to time on any of three different tests to classify agency
action. A distinction between forward looking declarations
(legislative) and backward looking declarations (adjudicative) has
been drawn by some courts."' If the agency declaration affects only
future conduct, it may be said that the agency is acting as a
legislature and should not be bound by the rules of the courtroom.
On the other hand, a declaration which defines the legal conse-
quences of past conduct is much the same as the judgment of a
court, and the fact that the judgment is rendered by an agency
rather than a court should not release the government from its
obligation to provide a fair hearing.
,5, Sinaiko, supra note 158, at 237; TRIBE, supra note 92 at 475-77.
'' See Linde, supra note 158, at 237; TRIBE, supra note 92, at 491-501. See generally
Tribe, "The Emerging Reconnection of Individual Rights and Institutional Design:
Federalism, Bureaucracy and Due Process of Lawmaking," 10 CREIGHTON L. REv. 433
(1977).
161 E.g., Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 226 (1908). The past versus
future test is also reflected in the constitutional ban against ex post facto laws by act of
Congress. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
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While the past versus future dichotomy generally corresponds to
the legal consequences of legislative action versus judicial action,
it often produces absurd results. The fair hearing requirement
has never been relaxed for judicial proceedings leading to injunc-
tions or other orders having prospective effect, yet the past ver-
sus future test, if applied to courts, would result in the conclusion
that a fair hearing might be denied in such cases. Prospective
orders also may be issued by an agency where a denial of a fair
hearing would still seem to violate the heart of due process.
Should the past versus future test be applied to export licensing,
for example, any argument for due process would be foreclosed,
since license approval or denial has only prospective effect.
Nevertheless, the approval of licenses to engage in various other
regulated enterprises is normally subjected to the full panoply of
administrative due process.162 This exception to the past versus
future test is based on the conviction that government pro-
ceedings which are aimed at particular parties are inherently un-
fair if the parties singled out are not granted significant par-
ticipatory rights." The right to a hearing, to present evidence and
to cross-examine witnesses helps to mitigate the imbalance of
strength where the government chooses to confront select in-
dividuals rather than declaring universal law which must be ex-
plained to the public as a whole. Thus, some courts have stated
that agency action which has a general effect may be taken
without a formal hearing, while action which affects specific par-
ties is adjudicative and must follow a due process fair hearing. ' "
This second test of the character of government action, resting
on a distinction between declarations of general versus specific
applicability, avoids the pitfalls of the past versus future test, but
has limitations of its own. Again, the actual role of the courts and
legislatures in our society belies any mechanical test of what is a
judicial function. Some civil actions may result in judgments affec-
ting thousands, and yet it is established that the proceedings must
follow the rules of a due process fair hearing."5 Legislative enact-
"' The Administrative Procedure Act provides that licensing hearings shall be treated
as adjudicative. 5 U.S.C. § 551(6) (1976).
'" TRIBE, supra note 92, at 476-77; Sinaiko, supra note 158, at 888; Note, The Supreme
Court, 1964 Term, 79 HARV. L. REV. 105, 121 (1965).
'" E.g., Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915). The
general versus specific test is also reflected in the constitutional ban against bills of at-
tainder, which prevents trial by legislative method. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
'1 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
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ments affecting a much smaller number of parties are valid
despite the absence of any elements of procedural due process.",
If the general versus specific test did reflect the essential dif-
ferences between the legislative and adjudicative functions, it
would still be necessary to determine what number of affected
parties should trigger due process requirements. Any line-
drawing for the application of due process principles based on
numbers of affected parties would necessarily be arbitrary. The
licensing of particular export transactions under the EAA would
fit easily into the adjudicatory class if the general versus specific
test were applied. The placement of types of exports on the Com-
modity Control List, however, may affect a very small number of
manufacturers-possibly only one-or the number of manufac-
turers affected may be very large.
A third test that has gained considerable currency complements
the past versus future and general versus specific tests by looking
at the decision making process with particular regard for the
nature of the "facts" on which the declaration is based."6 7 The ad-
judicative versus legislative facts test illuminates the fundamen-
tal principle of due process that some kinds of judgments should
not be left to mere speculation after informal debate. Decisions
which are based on a finding of particular facts or occurrences
must be made as accurately as possible if the law is to be applied
in a fair and rational manner. Adversary proceedings, with the
full participation of those persons most directly concerned with
the outcome, provide the best insurance for rational judgments
where a truly scientific method of inquiry is impossible."8
Legislative proceedings, on the other hand, generally result in a
declaration of principles for all situations of a class. A legislature
cannot make laws which are fine-tuned for each citizen.
Legislative declarations are therefore based on generalizations
about what is probably best for all. To make a fair generalization,
the legislature can only draw a sampling of relevant data or allow
for informal debate by the political representatives of very broad
interests. A due process adversarial hearing would not be ap-
"' See, e.g. Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977), where the
Court upheld legislation placing the presidential papers and tapes of Richard Nixon in the
custody of the General Services Administration.
"e See B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 201-03 (1976).
"' See International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 652 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(Bazelon, J., concurring).
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propriate for this purpose. Moreover, legislative findings may
represent little more than value judgments which might be
debated but which are in the end impossible to verify empirically.
As laws become more specific in impact, and therefore based on
more particular data, it becomes increasingly difficult to differen-
tiate legislative facts versus adjudicative facts. Nor does the
legislative facts versus adjudicative facts distinction work con-
sistently well even in the judicial context. A judge or jury is often
called upon to make generalizations and value judgments in order
to give content to such legal abstractions as the "reasonable man
standard.""9 Nevertheless, a legislative facts versus adjudicative
facts analysis of the export regulation system reveals some clear
instances in which adjudicative procedures would be appropriate.
The military usefulness or foreign availability of a commodity are
two adjudicative issues; other adjudicative issues might appear
depending on the particular basis for the agency's decision.
Foreign policy judgments, however, even when made with respect
to a single export license, are generally value laden and cannot be
subjected to a full due process hearing.
The legislative versus adjudicative facts test is merely an addi-
tional tool in determining what due process requires. No single
test or combination of tests can always lead to a precise result.
The Administrative Procedure Act relies primarily on the past
versus future test 70 with a special exception for licensing pro-
cedures, which must always be adjudicatory."7' Where strict ap-
plication of the past versus future test would not comport with
basic notions of due process, the courts have shown a willingness
to rely on the alternative tests. 7 That some decisions must be
relegated to informal, legislative forums, however, does not re-
quire a complete sacrifice of the adversarial ideal. Earnest debate
is still the best means of obtaining rational decisions compatible
with national values, and representation of affected interests is
the surest stimulus to earnest debate.
"' See J. HENDERSON & R. PEARSON, THE TORTS PROCESS 284-85 (1975).
170 5 U.S.C. § 551(6), (7) (1976).
' Id. § 551(6), (7), (9).
172 See, e.g. Geneva Towers Tenants Organization v. Federated Mortgage Inv., 504 F.2d
483 (9th Cir. 1974); D.C. Federation of Civic Association, Inc. v. Volpe, 434 F.2d 436 (D.C.
Cir. 1970). The freedom of the courts to "add" due process procedures was curtailed by Ver-
mont Yankee Nuclear Power v. National Resources Defense Council, 98 S.Ct. 1197 (1978),
but the Court also indicated that requirements beyond those of the APA might be man-
dated where rules affected a very small number.
[Vol. 9:577
FOREIGN COMMERCE POWER
Between the extreme situations, where there can exist no doubt
whether or not due process principles should be applied, there ex-
ists a continuum in which administrative action is best described
as a hybrid of varying measures of legislative and adjudicative
character. Within this range, due process need not be an all or
nothing requirement.
Many actions taken by the OEA and other federal agencies
under the EAA are distinctly adjudicative despite the lack of fun-
damental procedural safeguards. Each proceeding to approve or
deny a license is adjudicative in the classic sense. The effect of the
ruling is prospective, but it is binding on one party and one ap-
plication only, and many of the conclusions upon which it is based
rest on a consideration of adjudicative facts. Even the decision to
place certain types of exports on or off the Commodities Control
List may be adjudicative in nature, especially where the number
of producers actually affected by the ruling is very small. In the
Oshkosh truck case, ' for example, the Department of Commerce
published new regulations of immediate effect just prior to the ex-
port by Oshkosh of heavy duty trucks to Libya. The new regula-
tions required a validated license for the export of "off-highway
wheel tractors of carriage capacity ten tons or more, and parts, to
Libya," which was a fairly precise description of Oshkosh's pend-
ing deal. Neither trucks of a smaller size nor jeeps were covered
by the regulations. Although the revision of the Commodities Con-
trol List was motivated primarily by the particular transaction
between Oshkosh and Libya, the Department of Commerce im-
posed the restriction by the promulgation of a rule of general ap-
plicability.
B. Due Process and the National Interest
Defenders of the export regulation process have raised
numerous public interest arguments against the use of due pro-
cess hearings for the approval of exports. Of greatest concern has
been the fear that hearings would overburden the agency '74 and
jeopardize national security by publicizing military and foreign
policy secrets and restraining freedom of action. 75 Yet the due
process clause has been applied in the past in the face of compel-
ling public interests in a conciliatory fashion. The introduction of
"' UNITED STATES EXPORT WEEKLY, May 16, 1978, at A-1; id., May 30, 1978, at A-10.
,71 See e.g., 1976 House Hearings, supra note 4, at 523 (statement of A. Downey).
1,5 Id. at 521.
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principles of due process does not require the use of courtroom
trial procedures in every instance.
Procedural due process was originally thought to guarantee only
the right to a trial in accordance with the common law tradition.176
As the government grew and experimented with new means of
regulation, the principles of due process were extended to ad-
ministrative actions to deny Congress and the legislatures the
power to enact any procedure which they might choose.177 Even
while due process was being applied to introduce new procedural
requirements, the common law elements of due process were be-
ing discarded where an overriding contemporary need could be
established. In holding against the common law requirement of in-
dictment by a grand jury, the Supreme Court spoke in Hurtado v.
California78 of the variability of the due process clause:
There is nothing in Magna Charta, rightly construed as a broad
charter of public right and law, which ought to exclude the best
ideas of all systems of every age; and as it was the characteristic
principle of the common law to draw its inspiration from every
fountain of justice, we are not to assume that the sources of its
supply have been exhausted. On the contrary, we should expect
that the new and various experiences of our own situation and
system will mould and shape it into new and not less useful
forms. '79
The applicability of the various elements of due process in the
administrative setting has been largely mooted in most fields of
regulation where the Administrative Procedure Act has estab-
lished the Congressional standard for fair proceedings. The Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act divides administrative actions into
rulemaking actions and adjudicative actions, and prescribes
separate procedures to asssure fairness in each kind of pro-
ceeding. Adjudicative proceedings require notice to the affected
parties, an opportunity to present evidence and cross-examine
witnesses, and a decision based on the record of the proceedings.1"
Rulemaking proceedings are less formal, requiring only general
notice in the Federal Register and an opportunity for written or
,' Linde, supra note 158, at 237.
" Id; Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 531 (1884).
, ' 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
Id. at 531.
, 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1976).
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oral comment by the public. Agency rules need not be based ex-
clusively on the record.18 '
Despite this statutory standard for procedure, numerous excep-
tions to the coverage of the Administrative Procedure Act have
produced a substantial amount of litigation testing the minimum
judicially acceptable requirements of administrative due process.
In Mathews v. Eldridge,'82 the Supreme Court identified three fac-
tors to be weighed in establishing minimum procedural safe-
guards in any given administrative action:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official ac-
tion; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such in-
terest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and final-
ly, the Government's interest, including the function involved
and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail. '83
In the regulation of exports, the first two factors cited in
Eldridge-the private interest affected and the risk of error
under existing proceedings-weigh heavily in favor of a formal
hearing for the approval of licenses. Although there can be no
vested constitutional right to trade with foreign nations,'" due
process rights attach whenever the government acts to deprive a
person of the enjoyment of a substantial property interest, even if
the deprivation is only an economic regulation of the use of the
property interest." The private interest at stake in a single ex-
port transaction may range in value of up to hundreds of millions
of dollars. Denial or revocation of an export license after substan-
tial investment by the applicant may cause a severe financial
strain or even bankruptcy for the enterprise. '" Of equal impor-
tance is the economic livelihood of local communities dependent on
the manufacture of the export and of the nation as a whole in its
"' 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976).
424 U.S. 319 (1976).
Id at 334-35, quoting Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S.
886, 895 (1961).
'" United States v. Yoshida International, Inc. v. 526 F. 2d 560, 580 (C.C.P.A. 1975); Moon
v. Freeman, 379 F. 2d 382 (9th Cir. 1967).
" See TRIBE. supra note 92, at 509, 511.
"M 1978 House Hearings, supra note 121, at 34 (statement of J. Gray). In Daedalus Enter-
prises, Inc. v. Kreps, No. 78-983 (D.D.C. May 18, 1978), the exporter was exposed to the loss
of a multi-million dollar deal which would have exceeded its entire sales for the prior year,
and was threatened with the loss of $140,000 in penalties to the importer.
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effort to strengthen its balance of payments.187 The possibility of
an error in judgment is substantial where the applicant is denied a
meaningful opportunity to contest the challenges raised by
government agencies against the license, and the continuing disaf-
fection of Congress and industry with the results of export regula-
tion indicates the need for a more rational and predictable pro-
cedure.
Also in the government's interest is the need to dispose of a
great volume of license applications quickly. Both the cost of ad-
ministration and the need of exporters to have a quick determina-
tion of their applications weigh in favor of a system that is highly
efficient. The actual cost and delay of a shift to due process hear-
ings, however, is easily overestimated. The total number of ap-
plications is substantial,1 but only those licenses not readily ap-
proved would require hearings.' Unless the administrative
burden proves to be overwhelming, the cost of due process cannot
serve as a justification for the absolute denial of a fair hearing. In
Goldberg v. Kelley,'9 the Court ordered that the right to a hear-
ing be extended to state actions terminating eligibility for
welfare, despite substantial evidence of the great administrative
burden that would ensue.191
It is the weight of the government interest in national security
and foreign policy which has been adduced most often to justify
the OEA's departure from the traditional due process model.192
But the importance of these governmental interests should not be
permitted to negate all due process protections if a reasonable ac-
... See generally note 3 supra. Export regulation may have its greatest impact as a deter-
rent to small technical enterprises that cannot afford the risk of investment in transactions
which may finally be disapproved by the Department of Commerce. For a discussion of the
importance of these enterprises in the United States economy, see Flender & Morse, The
Role of New Technical Enterprises in the United States Economy, reprinted in Export
Policy Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Finance of the Senate Comm.
on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, and the Subcomm. on Science, Technology and
Space of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation 95th Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. 7, at 179 (1978). See also id. at 41-42 (statement of Bardos).
'" In 1979, export license applications were predicted to total 70,000 for the year.
Bingham & Johnson, supra note 51, at 902.
"' In 1975, for example, only about one percent of all applications were formally rejected.
Export Licensing of Advanced Technology: Hearings Before the House Subcomm. in Int'l
Trade and Commerce of the Comm. on Int'l Relations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 71 (1976) (state-
ment of A. Downey) [hereinafter 1976 Export Licensing Hearings].
397 U.S. 254 (1970).
See also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580 (1975).
'" See note 175 supra.
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commodation is possible. The history of the due process clause
and its repeated clashes with national security interest supports
the conclusion that the government is obligated to seek such an
accommodation.
The Court has consistently held that the due process clause
does not melt away in the face of a crisis of national security or
foreign policy. Every exercise of Congressional authority, in-
cluding the war-power, is accompanied by the constitutional de-
mand that legislation be administered in accordance with due pro-
cess of law. 193 Instead of scrapping due process altogether where
the need for discretion and speedy action are unusually great, the
Court has adjusted its due process demands. "The requirements
of due process," the Court noted in Zemel v. Rusk,'" "are a func-
tion not only of the extent of the governmental restriction imposed,
but also of the extent of the necessity for the restriction."'95 In
setting the proper balance between national emergency and due
process the Court has often expressed a special deference to the
judgment of Congress,'" but has not abdicated its responsibility to
guard against unjustified encroachments upon the basic tenets of
fairness. No particular formula has been followed by the Court in
resolving conflicts between national security and due process, but
a plausible solution is suggested by Ex Parte Milligan.'97 First, the
necessity for abbreviated procedures must be "actual and
present," and second, due process must yield only as far as need-
ed. "As necessity creates the rule, so it limits its duration."'9 8
The legitimate security interests in the restriction of exports
necessitates a treatment unlike that accorded government in-
terests in the orderly administration of welfare or other domestic
programs. The procedures for export regulation must be styled to
safeguard national security interests without eroding the most
basic tenets of due process. It remains only to ask what pro-
cedures may be required.
"' Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1962); Societe Internationale Pour Par-
ticipations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers 357 U.S. 197, 211 (1958); Galvan v.
Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530-31 (1953); Joint Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123,
173 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); U.S. v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 88 (1921).
19 381 U.S. 1 (1963).
lg Id at 14.
' North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908).
... 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
'" Id at 127. See also United States v. Russell, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 623, 628 (1871).
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VI. THE REQUIREMENTS OF DUE PROCESS
A. Due Process and Executive Policy
Just as due process has traditionally not been applied to legisla-
tive action, due process has also been denied as a rule of procedure
in adjudication and the administration of law where a decision of the
executive branch is made within its political discretion. The occa-
sions for executive discretion in matters of foreign policy and na-
tional security are many, since the executive branch will often
benefit from its independent political authority in the field of in-
ternational relations. Thus, in reviewing executive branch ad-
ministration of foreign policy based regulations, the Court has
distinguished considerations of foreign policy from the manner in
which policy is executed.1
This conceptual division between policy, and the application of
principles already formulated to particular parties and cir-
cumstances, parallels the division between legislative and ad-
judicative functions which marks the theoretical boundary of ad-
ministrative due process. The argument against due process in
the making of policy is more compelling where government action
involves an exercise of its foreign policy discretion, if the ex-
ecutive branch is truly imbued with an independent foreign policy
power.
But, having set the direction and course of policy, agencies and
executive officials can only implement that policy by due process
of law, regardless of the national security or foreign policy in-
terests which are the basis of the policy. What due process
demands in the absence of a ready-made procedure such as that
provided by the Administrative Procedure Act cannot be
answered with a single solution good for all circumstances. Rules
of procedural fairness must reflect the essential values of due pro-
cess, yet be structured to properly safeguard legitimate security
needs. In the administrative context, three values may be distilled
from the procedural rules now associated with due process. First,
the administrative process must be visible. Decisions and rules
made in secrecy undermine public confidence and destroy the
necessary certainty of government policy. Second, the ad-
ministrative process must be rational, for it is fundamental to the




meaning of "fair" government that decisions must be based on an
accurate portrayal of the facts, followed by a principled applica-
tion of the law. Third, the administrative process must be respon-
sive to the public, not only indirectly through the political institu-
tions established by the constitution, but also directly to the
public by encouraging broader, more meaningful public participa-
tion in the making and execution of the law.
B. Procedural Elements
1. Visibility. "A popular Government," wrote James Madison,
"without Popular information or the means of acquiring it is but a
Prologue to a Farce or Tragedy; or perhaps both." ' The appeal
for a visible government permeates the constitution. It appears in
the First Amendment demand for a free press and open com-
munication between citizens; in the creation of a popularly elected
legislative body; in the command that every criminal trial shall be
public, with the right to a jury drawn from the local community;
and in the due process requirement that no person shall be deprived
of life, liberty or property without the benefit of a fair hearing.
Visibility is that quality of government by which the public may
comprehend the objectives, processes and limits of government
authority.
If government action is to be confined by law, the principles by
which the government shall operate must be publicized with suffi-
cient clarity that the public can reasonably predict what the govern-
ment will do under certain circumstances."0 ' Visible government
enables the public to regulate its own affairs with some certainty
"' Letter from James Madison to W. Barry, August 4, 1822, reprinted in 9 WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON 103 (Hunt ed. 1910).
"' The void for vagueness doctrine is applied to invalidate statutes which would leave a
reasonable man in doubt about what action might provoke government action. Lanzetta v.
New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 458 (1939). Exporters have prior notice, through the Commodity
Control List, of what transactions must have prior approval, and are therefore sufficiently
informed of what actions would lead to criminal liability.
The due process standard for precision of rules, however is also applicable to government
programs which dispense benefits or privileges. In Gonzalez v. Freeman, 334 F. 2d 570 (D.C.
Cir. 1964) the court held invalid the debarrment of a government contractor because there
were no published standards for debarrment. In Holmes v. New York City Housing
Authority, 398 F. 2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968), the court ordered a government housing authority
to draft standards to govern the allocation of 10,000 housing units to 90,000 applicants. Ac-
cord, White v. Roughton, 530 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1976); Baker-Chaput v. Cammett, 406 F.
Supp. 1134, 1137 (D.N.H. 1976); Quad City Community News Service, Inc. v. Jebens, 334 F.
Supp. 8 (S.D. Iowa 1971).
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of what they may expect of the government in return. Predictable
government is also essential to the democratic ideal, for it is a cor-
ollary to the rule of law that the law must be ascertainable. Un-
bridled discretion, exercised without principle, or by a secret prin-
ciple, is a power without responsibility. 2 Ascertainable standards
of law must also be administered through processes that are visi-
ble to the public, so that principles of law will be properly applied,
government authority will not be abused, and public and private
rights may be enforced. An open process of administration builds
public confidence in the government, and reinforces the
legitimacy of our legal system through the intelligent participa-
tion and consent of the people."'
The lack of ascertainable standards in the regulation of exports
has drawn loud complaints by those who must "predict" how the
government will view a particular transaction. One industry
spokesman protested:
We cannot predict what it is we can and can't do. We cannot
guarantee things to customers. We cannot assure customers of
deliveries in any kind of time scale. We cannot plan our factory,
our production. We cannot realistically as business people know
what we are going to do. Predictability is the problem.2 4
The absence of ascertainable standards is pervasive on the broad
policy level as well as the technical level. United States foreign
policy at any particular moment can often be determined only
from unofficial pronouncements by the President or his advisors.
The failure of the government to publish in rule form foreign
trade objectives, and how those objectives are to be attained
through the use of export controls, can seldom be justified by the
need for secrecy. If export controls are imposed as a demonstra-
tion of national resolve, publication of the restrictions to be ap-
plied will normally be consistent with the foreign policy objective.
Where expeditious action is necessary, nondisclosure of new
policy or delayed disclosure should be the exception rather than
See cases cited note 201 supra. See also Joint Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341
U.S. 123, 171 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). For a general treatment of the problem of
administrative discretion, see Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. CHi. L. REV.
713, 729 (1969); Gardner, The Informal Actions of the Federal Government, 26 AM. U. L.
REV. 799 (1977).
203 See Bruff & Gelhorn, Congressional Control of Administrative Regulation: A Study
of Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1369, 1377 (1977).
' 1978 House Hearings, supra note 121, at 41 (statement of G. Bardos).
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the rule. The Administrative Procedure Act now contains a proper
compromise between the public interest in rapid action to deal
with truly urgent problems, and private interests in notification
where summary action is unnecessary. Section 553 provides an ex-
ception to the notice and hearing requirements for rulemaking
where notice would be "contrary to the public interest."' ,, Under
the Administrative Procedure Act, however, the agency is held to
account for its decision not to provide prior notice, since a "brief
statement" of the need for summary action must accompany the
new rule.2
At a more technical level, the classification of commodities
under the EAA fails to disclose the likelihood of approval. The
Commerce Department has recently published a list of controlled
commodities most likely to be granted export licenses, but the list
includes only technological goods which have not been significant-
ly upgraded within ten years.m Since it is the American
technological lead which promises most to restore the balance of
United States trade, this concession is not likely to significantly
improve the competitiveness of United States exporters. The
general standards for approval published in the regulations pro-
vide some guidance," 8 but leave very wide discretion in the agen-
cy, especially where applications are denied as a demonstration of
policy rather than because of the military usefulness of the ex-
port.
Equally as disturbing as the lack of clearly defined standards is
the invisibility of the processes by which exports are classified on
the CCL and licenses approved or denied. Rulemaking procedures
have traditionally not been subjected to the due process require-
ment of openness in adjudicative hearings.m Only recently have
some courts seriously questioned the immunity of rulemaking pro-
ceedings from the openness requirement. 10 Procedures under the
Administrative Procedure Act assure some public participation in
rulemaking and require the agency to publish a reasoned basis for
its decision."' Agencies excepted from the Administrative Pro-
5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1976).
206 1l
20 UNITED STATES EXPORT WEEKLY. May 30, 1978, at A-8; id. June 6, 1978, at A-11.
See text at notes 28-33, supra.
Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 489 (1944).
2O See, e.g., D.C. Federation of Civic Assoc., Inc. v. Volpe, 434 F.2d 436 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
See also note 172, supra; Hazard, supra note 158, at 94, arguing for a constitutional right to
participate in rulemaking.
" 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976).
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cedure Act for security reasons are generally free to promulgate
rules out of public view. 1 In addition to preventing any public
check on the authority of the Commerce Department and Defense
Department to classify exports, the lack of any public information
on the basis of the classification makes a challenge of the
classification difficult if not impossible, and leaves exporters
uncertain about how the restriction might be applied against
future transactions.
The secrecy of the license approval process can only be defend-
ed as a matter of national security and government convenience,
since the licensing process is distinctively adjudicative. Only
casual meetings between the applicant and government officials
have been allowed in practice. The usefulness of these meetings,
however, is impaired by the diffusion of authority among other
federal agencies.21 The challenges raised or considered by these
agencies cannot always be assembled in a single orderly presenta-
tion. As other agencies and departments become involved, the line
of communication between the applicant and government becomes
confused and even detached. Even exporters with a large and
steady business and a familiarity with the OEA may lose any
means of observing the progress of their applications when un-
familiar government agencies intervene."' Without a formal hear-
ing procedure, where objections can be raised and responses made
in an orderly fashion, businesses with infrequent export ex-
perience are likely to be left in a state of confusion or ignorance.
Because of the invisibility of the process, business cannot offer
responsive information to the government or renegotiate the deal
to assuage whatever doubts the government may have. Nor can
business reassure the foreign importer as to when or even whether
the license will be granted."5
The secrecy of the process might be cured in part by reasoned
explanations by the OEA for the extended consideration of export
licenses beyond the ninety day period, as is required under the
Act." Unfortunately, the OEA has often abused this procedure,
212 See generally Bonfield, Military and Foreign Affairs Function Rule-Making Under
the APA, 71 MICH. L. REV. 222, 229-30 (1971).
"' See text at notes 232-33, infra. See also Timberg, Wanted: Administrative Safeguards
for the Protection of the Individual in International Economic Regulation, 17 AD. L. REV.
159, 169 (1965), discussing the use of informal meetings by the State Department in the ad-
ministration of other regulations.
... See, e.g., 1978 House Hearings, supra note 121, at 43 (statement of G. Bardos).
212 Comptroller General, Report to Congress, supra note 46, at 1.
... See text at notes 55-59, supra.
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either by sending no explanation for the delay at all, or by sending
only a very brief explanation which does little to enlighten the ap-
plicant.2" The OEA is also required to inform applicants of the
reason for the denial of any export license, but only the "statutory
basis" for the denial is needed. A rejection based simply "on
grounds of national security" is common.218
The need to protect secret information or the integrity of the
policymaking function does not require the shroud that has been
placed over the export regulation process. Evidence which must
be classified can be protected without obscuring the entire -pro-
cess as well. The Commerce Department now provides a fair hear-
ing, complete with all Administrative Procedure Act safeguards,
before the imposition of penalities for violations of the regula-
tions. '19 The adequacy of traditional means of protecting sensitive
material is not more dubious where the proceeding is one for
the approval of a license rather than the imposition of a civil penalty.
The invisibility of the export licensing procedure has implica-
tions beyond due process. Accountability under the delegation of
authority principle is impeded because Congress as well as the
public is left in the dark. The lack of coordinated oversight within
the executive branch might also be attributed to the lack of any
definite, formal procedure for combining the efforts of all in-
terested federal agencies. Judicial oversight too is hampered by
the absence of reviewable criteria.
2. Responsiveness. In its most rudimentary form, due process
requires the right to be heard before a deprivation of life, liberty
or property.'O Whether by oral argument, confrontation or writ-
ten submission, it is essential to the accountability and fundamen-
tal fairness of the law that persons immediately and directly af-
fected by government action be allowed to present their own case.
The formality of the hearing and the extent of the petitioner's role
in the proceedings depends on the particularity of the proposed
government action " 1 and the significance of the private and public
'" UNITED STATES EXPORT WEEKLY. supra note 122, at-M-2 (statement of T. Christiansen);
id. at M-6 (statement of Loeffler); 1978 House Hearings, supra note 121, at 30 (statement of
J. Gray).
"' See text at notes 60-61, supra; 1978 House Hearings, supra note 121, at 20 (statement
of J. Gray).
5 U.S.C.A. App. § 2405(a)(2)(B) (Cum. Supp. 1978).
Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914).
U See text at notes 157-73, supra.
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interests at stake.' Rulemaking actions of appointed bodies are
generally required by statute to allow written comment by the
public after notice of the proposed action. On occasion the courts
and Congress have required an opportunity for oral comment as
the number of affected parties becomes smaller.' s In the ad-
judicatory setting, an oral hearing is the rule rather than the ex-
ception, and because the issues in an adjudication are highly
focused, the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses
is also extended.'
The primary function of the right to a hearing is to provide for
an exchange of ideas and information upon which a decision may
be based. 5 As the impact of the agency action becomes more
specific, the affected parties are more likely to possess unique
knowledge and understanding of the problem. Participation by the
affected parties then improves the accuracy and fairness of the
final decision. Issues of international relations are likely to be based
on information largely, if not exclusively, in the hands of the
government. Only rarely could a formal adjudicative hearing
gather broader or more reliable evidence. Yet export licensing
decisions typically involve questions of the technical capacity and
adaptability of equipment or know-how, of the availability of
foreign sources of supply, and of the probable economic impact of
a restricting regulation or a rejection of a license application. The
government will often lack independent, techical expertise to in-
telligently evaluate complex and sophisticated goods. In these cir-
cumstances the participation of exporters is essential. If the
regulatory system is closed to the regulated public, there is a
danger that bureaucratic intransigence will set in, and the agency
will become complacent with its own obsolescent information1 6
See text at notes 176-81, supra.
E.g., Thompson v. Washington, 497 F.2d 626 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Walter Holm & Co. v.
Hardin, 449 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The freedom of the courts to add new due process
elements to the provisions of the APA was greatly curtailed by Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power v. National Resources Defense Council, 98 S.Ct. 1197 (1978), which equated minimum
due process standards with the APA. The Court did observe, however, that in a rule-
making proceeding, safeguards might be required beyond those of the APA if very few par-
ties were affected by the action.
"' Wilner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963); see also 5 U.S.C. §
554(c) (1976).
' Bonfield, supra note 212, at 229-30, 283-84; Hahn, supra note 156, at 498; Comment,
The APA and Agency Policy Statements, 43 U. CHi. L. REV. 430, 451-52 (1976).
2 Bonfield, supra note 212, at 229-30.
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Complaints fron the exporting industry suggest that the OEA suf-
fers from this defect today.m
A secondary function of the right to be heard is to lend greater
legitimacy to government action in the eyes of those immediately
affected and of the observing public. This emotive element of the
right to be heard has seldom been expressly cited by the courts,22
but is widely accepted among scholars." Laurence Tribe has
described this function of the right to a hearing as the "intrinsic"
value of due process:
Whatever its outcome, such a hearing represents a valued
human interaction in which the person experiences at least the
satisfaction of participating in the decision that vitally concerns
her, and perhaps the separate satisfaction of receiving an ex-
planation of why the decision is being made in a certain way;
these rights to interchange express the elementary idea that to
be a person rather than a thing, is at least to be consulted about
what is done with one.2 30
Even if individual decisions cause some dissatisfaction in the los-
ing parties, in the long run the guarantee of a fair hearing is more
likely to be perceived as "just" by the public, and to instill in the
public greater confidence in the system. The lack of confidence of
United States exporters in the regulatory process is symptomatic
of the failure of the government to provide for any meaningful
participation of exporters in the system. There is a widespread
belief among exporters that they are afforded no opportunity to
communicate effectively with the government, and that their
arguments are ignored."1
The informal meetings arranged by the OEA between its staff
and license applicants have failed to provide the systematic in-
teraction which is necessary to an orderly delineation of issues
and presentation of evidence. Because of administrative dif-
ficulties and the policy of secrecy, the OEA is either not always
fully aware of what arguments are circulating in other offices of
the government or it is unwilling to reveal the arguments to the
E.g., 1978 Senate Hearings, supra note 121, at 19 (statement of J. Gray).
E.g., Joint Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171-72 (1951) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring).
20 L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, 73-74 (paper ed. 1958); Saphire, Specifying Due Process
Values: Toward a More Responsive Approach to Procedural Protection, 127 U. PA. L. REV.
111, 123 (1978); TRIBE, supra note 92, at 503.
TRIBE, supra note 92, at 503.
'' See 1976 Export Licensing Hearings, supra note 189, at 103-208.
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exporter. 2 As the parties dispose of one issue, resisting govern-
ment agencies may periodically raise one new challenge after
another, until the exporter has lost his contract by the passage of
time.2 The right to confrontation, ordinarily deemed essential to
adjudicative proceedings, may or may not be granted by the OEA.
Because the OEA is exempt from all hearing requirements, any
concessions toward a hearing are a matter of grace.
In order to draw on the technical knowledge of the export in-
dustry, the Commerce Department has established a number of
Technical Advisory Committees composed of individuals drawn
from various technology industries and government agencies.""
These committees contribute their expertise toward the develop-
ment of general principles and the classification of exported
technologies. Limited public participation in the meetings of the
Technical Advisory Committees is permitted by the Department
of Commerce regulations."5 But the Advisory Committees suffer
numerous defects which impair their usefulness to either the
government or the private sector. Committee members have
asserted that they have only one-way communication with govern-
ment officials. When committee reports are submitted pursuant to
the specific request of the government, the results of the commit-
tees' labors receive little or no government comment. If the report
is ignored or rejected, no reasons or criticisms are sent back to
the committee.m Many committee members believe that their ef-
fect on agency decisions is minimal. 7
The committees serve only to furnish the government with pro-
fessional advice. They do not act as a medium for interaction be-
tween the government and industry. Committee members sit as
individuals rather than as representatives of particular companies
Comptroller General, 1977 Report, supra note 78, at 9-10; Bingham & Johnson, supra
note 51, at 903. In its complaint in Daedalus Enterprises, Inc. v. Kreps, supra note 149,
Daidalus asserted several instances of misinformation by the Commerce Department.
UNITED STATES EXPORT WEEKLY, May 30, 1978, at 0-3. See also the problems encountered
by Cyril Bath Co. reported in UNITED STATES EXPORT WEEKLY, June 13, 1978, at A-3.
23 See UNITED STATES EXPORT WEEKLY. June 20, 1978, at M-4 (statement of E. Loeffler).
See text at note 38, supra.
- 15 C.F.R. § 390.1(f) (1978).
2W UNITED STATES EXPORT WEEKLY, June 20, 1978, at M-6 (statement of E. Loeffler); id,
at M-7 (statement of V. Henriques); 1978 House Hearings, supra note 4 at 601 (statement of
Western Electrical Manuf. Assoc.).
I Senate Hearings, supra note 122, at M-2 (statement of Christiansen); id., at M-7 (state-




or industries.' The deliberations and reports of the committees
are often classified and removed from the view of private ex-
porters.' This cloak of secrecy has been thrown over the commit-
tes notwithstanding the more liberal but successful practices in
other sensitive areas of government activity, such as defense con-
tracting, where individuals within each company are granted
clearance to examine classified documents.4 0 The secretive treat-
ment of the Technical Advisory Committees isolates the commit-
tees from their respective industries and prevents them from ser-
ving as a communicative link. It is especially needed that commit-
tee members be allowed to refer problems back to their own com-
panies to gather more specialized information when unique and
difficult issues are raised.2 11
Procedures following the model of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act can be structured to safeguard national security and
foreign policy while at the same time allowing exporters a useful
role in the proceedings. The formulation and review of the Com-
modities Control List should normally be preceded by public
notice of the exports to be considered and a hearing open to in-
terested businesses. The Administrative Procedure Act already
leaves sufficient discretion with agencies to allow the OEA to
limit participation to written comment if necessary. 242 Regulations
finally issued should be accompanied by a statement of their pur-
pose and basis, so that industries may come forward with new and
relevant information as market conditions change. In the approval
of licenses, applicants should be allowed a formal hearing before
the rejection of their licenses. The challenges by all government
agencies should be presented in an orderly fashion with a right to
examine the adverse documents or witnesses. New objections
should not be permitted after the hearing without a showing of
good cause for the delinquency or a threat to national security.
'M UNITED STATES EXPORT WEEKLY, June 20, 1978, at M-7 (statement of V. Henriques);
1976 House Hearings, supra note 4, at 623 (statement of Computer and Business Equip.
Manufacturers' Assoc.).
2n UNITED STATES EXPORT WEEKLY. June 20, 1978, at M-7 (statement of V. Henriques);
1976 House Hearings, supra note 4, at 623 (statement of Computer and Business Equip.
Manufacturers' Assoc.).
' 1976 House Hearings, supra note 4, at 623 (statement of Computer and Business
Equip. Manufacturers' Assoc.). The Department of Defense has published regulations for
the security clearance of industrial personnel in 32 C.F.R. pt. 155 (1978).
241 Id.
2 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1976).
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3. Rationality. The due process guarantee of openness and
participation in administrative proceedings would be of limited
value if some means was not provided to assure that the results of
the proceedings corresponded to the authorized goal of the agency
and the evidence presented before it. If the proceedings are to be
fair, they must be structured to minimize as far as reasonably
possible the chance of an erroneous or inequitable decision. Irra-
tional decisions are injurious to the affected parties, who are
denied what the law guarantees, and also to the public, which has
directed the agency to achieve some public good and is entitled to
decisions consistent with that objective.
Open procedures with an opportunity to respond are only an in-
termediate stage toward rational decision making. In the end, the
officer responsible for the decision must assimilate the informa-
tion and make his judgment. What transpires within the mind of
the decision maker is largely beyond the review or control of any
person or court, but a few due process principles have evolved to
prevent conditions likely to lead to an irrational decision. At least
in adjudicatory proceedings, the decision maker must be impar-
tial, " and must not engage in off the record ex parte communica-
tions with either side of the dispute.'" Although the thought pro-
cesses of the decision maker are immune from examination, a
written reason for the decision provides some basis for review."5
The problem of ex parte communication and unreviewable deci-
sions, however, is acute within the export regulation process. This
problem stems from the interagency consulting procedures of the
system and the exclusion of the exporter from interagency
meetings. Exporters should be allowed to examine the record on
which the decision is based to the maximum extent consistent
with national security, and ex parte conferences with officials of
consulting agencies should be used only to transmit security sen-
sitive information. Reasoned opinions would help to assure ra-
tionality by making possible meaningful review by the courts and
the public.
"I3 In Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973), the Court held that a financial interest of
the decision-maker in the case caused a bias of sufficient magnitude to violate due process.
In the administrative setting, however, bias must be more than a prediliction or even prej-
udiced outlook before a court will presume that the decision is tainted. FTC v. Cement In-
stitute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
14 Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 480 (1935).
245 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
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Finally, it is necessary to the rational administration of the law
that there is personal responsibility for the decisions that are
made within the agency. This principle stems from the first of a
series of Supreme Court cases known as Morgan v. United States.
In Morgan I, 46 the plaintiffs charged that the Secretary of
Agriculture had signed a department order without having per-
sonally read or heard any of the evidence or arguments of the pro-
ceedings. The sole basis for the Secretary's decision was his con-
sultation with department employees out of the presence of the
plaintiffs. The Court reversed the order.
It is no answer to say that the question for the court is whether
the evidence supports the findings and the findings support the
order. For the weight ascribed by the law to the findings -
their conclusiveness when made within the sphere of the
authority conferred - rests upon the assumption that the of-
ficer who makes the findings has addressed himself to the
evidence, and upon that evidence has conscientiously reached
the conclusions which he deems it to justify. That duty cannot
be performed by one who has not considered evidence or argu-
ment. It is not an impersonal obligation. It is a duty akin to that
of a judge. The one who decides must hear.21 7
More accurately, as the Court later conceded, the one who decides
must at least be familiar with the written record taken by agency
employees."8 Nevertheless, the rule of Morgan I is more valuable
as an expression of an administrative ideal than as an enforceable
standard of law. The ideal is that administrative decisions gain
their legitimacy from a legal authorization to the particular per-
sons who make the decisions. Morgan I was partially disarmed by
Morgan IV, 2" 9 which held that administrative officials could not be
questioned at trial concerning the processes by which they reached
their conclusions or the manner and extent of their consideration
of the record. What remains is the hope that administrative deci-
sions will be made by accountable persons rather than impersonal
bureaucratic institutions.
The immediate object of Morgan I was to assure that agency
orders would be issued by one having legal authority to make the
decision and a reasonable acquaintance with the facts of the case.
24 298 U.S. 468 (1936).
117 Id. at 481 (emphasis added).
"' 313 U.S. 409 (1941).
"A Id.
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This "personalization" of the fair hearing requirement has an im-
portance beyond the legal and political accountability of the
deciding official. It lays the foundation for rational government ac-
tion. The centralization of decision making authority in a single,
publicly known body or individual provides the parties with a
single responsible judge to whom they may address their argu-
ments. If the authority to decide is scattered or institutionalized,
the danger is magnified that some arguments will pass unobserved
by one or another deciding official. The export license application
procedure is illustrative of this problem. Applications are sent to
a variable assortment of departments and offices in a pattern that
is unknown to exporters. The good rapport which some exporters
have with the Department of Commerce is of little use when the
application is laid before a more antagonistic agency. The OEA
has attempted to familiarize applicants with the challenges that
have been or will be raised by other Departments, but this infor-
mation is often erroneous, incomplete or misleading.25°
If the issues raised by a license application are departmentalized
and farmed out to specialized offices, there must at some point be
a general review of all the evidence and proposed conclusions of
fact. Especially where a balancing of interests is required, or
where the issues are interrelated, the case must be considered in
its entirety. The balance of interests will be upset if the final deci-
sion is made by those who view the case from a single vantage.
Review by a single independent officer or board, or a majority
vote of the interested departments tends to restore the equipoise
of the decision making process, but export licensing decisions are
presently subject to the veto of any voting department. Conclu-
sions made by one department or agency, based on its own special
concern and perspective, become overriding.
When a favorable decision is rendered on an export application,
the exporter also has an interest in the finality of the decision.
Where a single person or body has committed itself to a position, a
reversal is likely only in the case of an unexpected turn of events.
But if authority is widely scattered among disjointed agencies, con-
clusions reached at any point in the process may represent only
momentary political victories of one or another faction, whose in-
fluence may ebb or flow with the next day. Since export licenses
are subject to revocation at any time without notice, the stability
w See notes 232 and 233, supra.
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of licensing decisions is of great importance. Decisions should be
made by an independent body, or by a majority vote of the par-
ticipating departments, whose votes could be weighted according
the policies and objectives of the EAA. The result would be a
more rational balancing of interests, and a greater finality of
judgments. If one department objects that a vital national interest
has not been adequately considered, an appeal to the next higher
level of government, eventually as far as the President, would
assure that each interest is accorded due significance, and would
have the further benefit of leading to a more coherent application
of government policies.
VII. CONCLUSION
The broad discretion vested in the executive branch by the
EAA has failed to produce the coherence of policy that might have
been expected for a regulatory system dominated by the Presi-
dent. In many respects, the executive branch has come to resem-
ble the diffuseness of Congress, and the disadvantages of Presi-
dential control remain prominent. Lacking the broad representa-
tion of domestic interests characteristic of Congress, the ex-
ecutive provides no public forum for the balancing of long range
national goals. What remains for the President as an asset in
foreign policy is his access to immediate information and his abili-
ty to decide quickly and act expeditiously. To combine the virtues
of Congress and the President, it is necessary to return general
policymaking to the Congressional forum, so that continuing
policies may be forged in a democratic manner. In addition, a
reasonable measure of discretion for urgent action may be re-
served to the President within guidelines established by Congress
for national security controls. Foreign policy objectives of a more
general nature should be created in Congress with the support of
the President.
It is very doubtful, however, that accountability can any longer
be achieved by a simple calculus of separtion of powers. Congress
must enlist the regulated public and affected communities as
associate watchdogs through the extension of administrative due
process. The responsibility for setting the new balance between
fairness and foreign policy necessarily lies in Congress. The
courts are unlikely to initiate the move toward due process in
foreign commerce regulation until they are confronted with the
most egregious cases of executive indifference to rights, and they
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will be understandably reluctant to move beyond minimum ad-
ministrative due process. A more exacting procedure, consistent
with constitutional demands and the value of maximum accounta-
bility, must originate in Congress. The proposed increased role of
Congress will infringe no constitutional prerogative of the Presi-
dent. The preeminence of Congress in making foreign policy and
especially in the regulation of foreign commerce assures the
power of Congress to link foreign commerce powers to a
machinery that is tuned for the full implementation of Congres-
sional policies.
The proposal of this Note should not be regarded as a radical
idea. Extension of the Administrative Procedure Act to export
regulation was early discussed by Congress but rejected prin-
cipally because pervasive export regulation was at first viewed as
a temporary measure. 5 1 The lack of administrative due process in
other fields of foreign relations regulation has been persuasively
decried by other writers.252 The Administrative Procedure Act of-
fers a workable model with built-in safeguards for national securi-
ty, and could with slight adjustment be applied to export regula-
tion. The national interest in accountable government, which is
equal to the interest in security, will not be served by other than
fair and open procedures.
Richard R. Carlson
ADDENDUM
On September 29, 1979, Congress enacted the Export Ad-
ministration Act of 1979. The new act follows the 1969 Act in many
respects, but has also implemented some important changes. The
statement of a policy of export promotion has been strengthened,
and the President is required to report to Congress regularly on the
necessity for any existing foreign policy controls.
New avenues have been opened for the participation of exporters
in the composition and review of the Commodity Control List, and
the responsible agencies are directed to attach more informative ex-
planations to the denial of any export application. While much re-
mains to be done, the new act represents a salutary move toward ac-
countable government.
"' Berman & Garson, supra note 2, at 797-98.
See Bonfield, supra note 212; Timberg, supra note 213.
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